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With fifty-seven member states and a remarkably broad definition of security, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) offers an unparalleled 
platform for crisis management across Europe and the Former Soviet Union. Despite its 
unique advantages and a history of successful crisis intervention, however, the 
organization has long been plagued by transparency issues, wide-ranging criticism, and 
a broad lack of support. These issues can be seen clearly by examining its involvement 
in the international response to the 2013-14 Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine. This 
less-than-successful intervention stands in sharp contrast to the OSCE’s more effective 
crisis management efforts during the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. This study 
aims to examine two of the organization's best practices in the field of crisis 
management, monitoring and mediation, and to identify the factors which may 
influence the effectiveness of these tools. Relying on a combination of scholarly 
articles, OSCE documents, and statements from politicians, political analysts, and 
popular media sources, I will these two of examples of twenty-first century Ukrainian 
revolutions to show that using its best practices of crisis monitoring and mediation the 
OSCE has the potential to positively influence intrastate crises which occur within its 
area of operation, but that the organization loses considerable effectiveness when it 
lacks consensus among its members, international support, public trust, or a reasonable 
response time  





The OSCE and Ukraine 
When thousands of dissatisfied Ukrainians began constructing barricades and 
pitching tents in Kyiv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) during the biting 
winter of 2013 to protest corruption in the administration of then-president Viktor 
Yanukovych, an extreme feeling of déjà vu must have permeated the air. Almost 
exactly nine years earlier that same square was occupied by a similar throng of angry 
citizens protesting the very same politician. While the 2004 Orange Revolution was 
focused primarily on electoral fraud and the 2013-14 Euromaidan Revolution was in 
response to wider governmental corruption, the protests shared a startling degree of 
similarity. 
First and most obviously, as the two revolutions took place in the same location 
and were driven by similar groups of people, both were influenced by the same cultural, 
linguistic, historical, and geographic variables. Similarly corrupt administrations were 
in power during both revolutions, and both ended with the Russian-backed Yanukovych 
being denied a place in the government. In 2004, the protests unfolded over the course 
of a dubious election which would have seen him illegitimately installed as the new 
president. Despite this loss for Yanukovych, six years later the people of Ukraine, 
frustrated with the slow pace of change, offered him a second chance when they voted 
him president in 2010. By 2013, however, many in the country believed he had 
overstepped his authority, defied his electoral mandate, and forfeited his right to lead. 
Although the initial spark of the two revolutions differed, according to Olga Onuch, the 




the majority of demonstration placards and posters focused on the regime’s corruption 
and on Yanukovych and his cronies’ criminal behavior. Pictures of the Orange 
Revolution and the Euromaidan would be difficult to distinguish if not for the 
prevalence of ‘Yushchenko orange’ in those from 2004 and ‘EU reflex blue,’ the 
dominant color of the EU flag, in those from 2013.”1 In both revolutions the majority of 
protesters focused their demands on the political protection of civil and human rights 
and sought an end to government corruption.2 
 In both cases, the protests were initially sparked in Kyiv in late November, were 
marked by huge public rallies, and achieved a similar size and scale.3 Overall, the 
predominantly Ukrainian-speaking West supported both uprisings while the primarily 
Russian-speaking East backed the administration in each occasion.4 Each revolution 
achieved a degree of success within a few months, after which elections were held, 
putting into power on both occasions candidates who were largely supported by the 
protesters. Both revolutions were generally backed by the West and opposed by 
Russia.5 Finally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
intervened in both revolutions in an attempt to help manage the crisis. 
         In 2004 at the invitation of the Ukrainian government, the OSCE sent hundreds 
of monitors to Ukraine as of a part of a regular International Election Observation 
Mission (IEOM) which stayed on the ground through the crisis and reported on 
developments internationally, allowing other states and stakeholders to respond 
                                               
1 Olga Onuch, “Comparing the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan,” in Ukraine’s Euromaidan: 
Analyses of a Civil Revolution, ed. David R. Marples and Frederick V. Mills (Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2015), 
50. 
2 Ibid., 48-50. 
3 Ibid., 40. 
4 Serhy Yekelchyk, The Conflict in Ukraine: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford, 2015), 85. 




appropriately as events unfolded. When the protests continued to escalate, the OSCE 
undertook crisis mediation efforts, eventually aiding the conflicting parties in reaching 
an amicable resolution which brought about electoral reform and a rerun of the final 
round of voting. In 2013, the OSCE was slower to act, despite the presence of its 
Project Co-Ordinator in Ukraine (PCU) based in Kyiv, and failed to send monitors until 
several months after the demonstrations ignited. Once it began its crisis management 
efforts, however, the OSCE deployed a large number of monitors and, when conditions 
on the ground worsened, again undertook crisis mediation efforts. Additionally, because 
of the growing intensity of the crisis, in 2014 the OSCE dispatched two additional 
missions which did not take place during the Orange Revolution, the Special 
Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) and the OSCE Observer Mission at the Russian 
Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk. 
 When the dust settled in 2005, a new democratically-elected president took 
office in Kyiv after an election rerun which was credited internationally as free and 
fair.6 Despite incredible tension, the protests never escalated to violence and only one 
protester is recorded as dying during the ordeal as a result of an unfortunate heart 
attack.7 Though corruption continues to plague the Ukrainian state years after the 
Orange Revolution, a number of the reforms put into place immediately after its 
resolution have persisted to this day, and, arguably more importantly, the revolution 
                                               
6 OSCE, “Ukraine Presidential Election 31 October, 21 November and 26 December 2004,” May 11, 
2005, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/14674. 
7 Leonid Nikitinsky, “Savik Shuster: I’m the Only Thing to Remain after ‘Orange Revolution,” 




represented a cultural shift and an important milestone in the growth of Ukrainian civil 
society.8 
 A decade later, however, events did not end so well. Although the Euromaidan 
Revolution did drive Yanukovych from power and install a new democratically-elected 
administration, over three years later Ukraine remains in a state of crisis. A full scale 
war is being waged in the east of the country as two oblasts remain out of government 
control and in open rebellion. The territory of Crimea was annexed by Russia and 
appears unlikely to return to Ukrainian ownership as Russia finishes construction of a 
massive bridge between the Crimean peninsula and the Russian mainland.9 The 
country’s economy is in shambles, and many point to the continued fighting in the east 
as a reason deeper reforms have failed to take hold.10 In the three years since the start of 
the revolution, tens of thousands of Ukrainians have been killed in the fighting and 
many more wounded.11 
The OSCE is neither tasked with nor capable of solving complex intrastate 
crises alone. A close inspection of the progression of the Orange Revolution, however, 
reveals that OSCE monitoring and mediation efforts positively contributed to the 
successful resolution of that crisis. Why then did the organization fail to have the same 
positive effect during the Euromaidan Revolution nine years later? While many factors 
influenced the paths of these two crises, in this thesis I will use these two cases of 
                                               
8 Anna Vorobyova, “Will the Colours Fade? The Successes and Failures after the Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine,” (master’s thesis, Simon Fraser University, 2009), 129. 
9 Shaun Walker, “Russia’s Bridge Link with Crimea Moves Nearer to Completion,” The Guardian, 
August 31, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/31/russia-bridge-link-crimea-moves-
nearer-completion-ukraine. 
10 Tamila Varshalomidze, “Was Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity in Vain?” Al Jazeera, January 7, 2018, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/ukraine-revolution-dignity-vain-171219084627117.html. 





Ukrainian revolutions to argue that using the tools of monitoring and mediation, the 
OSCE has the potential to positively influence intrastate crises which occur within its 
area of operation, but that the organization loses considerable effectiveness when it 




         While the numerous similarities offer compelling support for comparison, a few 
notable differences should be kept in mind when looking at these two cases. One major 
challenge manifests in the cases’ endogeneity. Because it occurred after the first 
revolution, the Euromaidan Revolution was without-a-doubt influenced by the Orange 
Revolution. The actors went into the second revolution with all of the knowledge and 
experience gained from both the Orange Revolution and from all the events that elapsed 
from 2004-2013. Despite the short time between these protests, however, a large-scale 
survey conducted during the Euromaidan Revolution showed that only 63% of those 
protesters had also participated in the Orange Revolution. According to Onuch, even 
accounting for age, a significant portion of Euromaidan participants were first-time 
protesters, much like in the Orange Revolution.12 The two protests also experienced 
different levels of coordination and organization, with the 2004 protests largely 
organized by networks of established activists and political opposition forces. In 2013-
14, by contrast, cooperation and coordination between activists, opposition leaders, and 
protesters was more complicated and highly contested.13 
                                               
12 Onuch, “Comparing the Orange Revolution,” 48. 




It should also be acknowledged that though the two revolutions occurred only a 
few years apart, technology advanced rapidly in that short timeframe. In 2004, great 
attention was given to the role of traditional media, while 2013-14 saw an 
unprecedented use of social media and other information and communication 
technologies to coordinate action.14 Finally, though both revolutions cumulated in new 
elections, the 2005 elections were largely applauded as free and fair, while the 2015 
elections were seen as fair-but-unrepresentative as a result of the active fighting which 
continued in the east and Russia’s occupation of Crimea.15 
On the side of the OSCE, the decade that transpired between the revolutions 
represents over a quarter of the OSCE’s lifespan, and thus changes in bureaucratic 
organization, increases in institutional knowledge, and differing resources all may have 
affected how the organization handled events. That said, one would expect that an 
additional decade of experience in crisis management would aid the OSCE in 
effectively responding to the crisis, so the fact that its influence was diminished the 
second time around provides part of the foundation of this thesis. Finally, the global 
geopolitical landscape of 2013-14 differed dramatically to that of 2004, a fact, as will be 
shown, which affected the OSCE’s ability to respond within a reasonable timeframe. 
 
Ukraine and the OSCE 
Ukraine’s relationship with the OSCE extends to the organization’s founding as 
the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) when the Ukrainian 
                                               
14 Tetyana Bohdanova, “Unexpected Revolution: the Role of Social Media in Ukraine’s Euromaidan 
Uprising,” European View (June 2014): 133-142, doi:10.1007/s12290-014-0296-4. 
15 OSCE, “Ukraine Presidential Election 31 October,”; OSCE, “Ukraine Early Presidential Election 25 




Soviet Socialist Republic signed the Helsinki Final Act in the summer of 1975. After 
the fall of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Ukraine immediately reestablished 
itself as a member of the soon-to-be-renamed OSCE. The organization established its 
first permanent mission to Ukraine in June 1994 with the mandate of resolving a then-
ongoing dispute on the status of Crimea in the new state.16 From 1994-1999 the OSCE 
Mission to Ukraine worked to prevent conflict in the territory of Crimea. After the 
completion of that mission’s mandate in 1999, the PCU was established, tasked with 
monitoring and supporting future OSCE undertakings in Ukraine.17 The OSCE has sent 
multiple election-monitoring missions, including for the elections which took place 
before, during, and after the 2004 and 2013-14 revolutions. With the escalation of 
tensions between Kyiv and the country’s eastern oblasts in 2014, the OSCE also created 
the SMM and, at the invitation of the Russian government, the OSCE Observer Mission 
at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk (both located on the Russian-
Ukrainian border). Between them, these missions cover the entire scope of the OSCE’s 
focus, from short-term crisis management to the promotion of long-term security in all 
three of the OSCE’s dimensions. 
         Where the Russian government has long viewed the OSCE skeptically, the 
people and governments of Ukraine have generally held the organization in higher 
favor, particularly among those supporting closer ties with the EU and Western 
Europe.18 In 2013, Ukraine chaired the OSCE General Assembly, a role which further 
                                               
16 OSCE, “OSCE Mission to Ukraine,” accessed March 1, 2018, http://www.osce.org/mission-ukraine-
1999-closed; see also OSCE, “Permanent Council Decision No. 295,” accessed March 1, 2018, 
http://www.osce.org/pc/29031, and OSCE, “Survey of OSCE Field Operations,” accessed March 1, 2018, 
http://www.osce.org/cpc/74783. 
17 OSCE, “OSCE Survey of Field Operations,” 
18 Andrew Wilson, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, NGOs, and the Role of the West,” Cambridge Review 




boosted societal and political affinity for the organization among Ukrainian citizens. 
According to Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry, while the country served as chair, it oversaw 
the pursuit of several human rights initiatives, organized a conference opposing human 
trafficking, furthered two major OSCE-run mediation efforts (one in South Ossetia, 
Georgia, and the other in Transnistria, Moldova), and facilitated several interstate 
discussions on arms control.19 
 
Stopping Violence Before It Starts 
The OSCE occupies a unique and powerful position in the international space. 
As the only regional security forum in which the US, Russia, and the EU regularly meet 
and discuss issues, it offers significant potential in facilitating peace and cooperation 
between these states. Additionally, thanks to its proven record of success, its neutrality, 
and its wide regional support, the OSCE carries an air of legitimacy that allows it to 
influence otherwise intractable conflicts in ways that single state intervention simply 
cannot. Despite this potential, as a consensus-based soft power organization, the 
effectiveness of the organization is greatly diminished when it lacks a reasonable 
response time, consensus among its members, international support, and public trust. In 
this thesis, I will use the two examples of Ukraine to demonstrate that when the OSCE 
possesses these four preconditions for success, it can use its best practices of crisis 
monitoring and mediation to positively influence intrastate crisis situations. 
                                               
19 “Результати головування України в ОБСЄ у першому півріччі 2013 року,” Ministry of Foreign 





Studying what influence the OSCE had on the course of events in Ukraine and 
why its influence differed between the two revolutions has the potential to reveal new 
and useful insight on the OSCE’s capacity to promote peace and stability within its 
sphere of influence. This study will be useful for examining the potential of the OSCE 
to positively influence intrastate crises, for exploring the OSCE’s most effective crisis-
management tools, and for understanding what factors can hinder successful 
intervention. 
At its core, the OSCE is a forum for discussion and a platform for action. By 
conducting meaningful research into the methods, variations, and outcomes of the 
OSCE’s crisis management efforts, the effectiveness of its actions may be analyzed and 
suggestions for its improvement offered. Though these cases are not perfectly 
comparable, the incredible similarities between the two events and the implications of 
their analysis allow this study to describe two of the OSCE’s most effective tools of 
crisis management and identity four conditions which may allow for these tools to be 
used most effectively. 
  
Summary of Contents 
I have divided this thesis into an introduction, three substantive chapters, and a 
conclusion. In the first chapter I provide the general background and context for my 
argument, including an overview of international organizations and their ability broadly 
to promote peace; a brief history and overview of the OSCE; a discussion of the OSCE 
as a soft power institution; and a review of some of its most significant crisis-




response tools, monitoring and mediation, and lay out the foundation for the remainder 
of my argument. 
In the second chapter, I trace the 2004 Orange Revolution as it unfolded, 
showing how public outrage at government corruption, manipulation of the media, and 
a general lack of transparency by then-president Kuchma’s administration spurred 
Ukrainian civil society into action, ultimately leading to a rerun of the second round of 
the 2004 presidential election and a reversal of the initial outcome. I will then go on to 
show how the OSCE employed its election monitors to ensure foreign attention was 
focused on the revolution and how it leveraged its wide membership and neutrality to 
mediate the conflict-resolution process, ultimately positively influencing the outcome of 
the revolution. I will conclude with an analysis of why the OSCE was well positioned to 
act and how its best practices were capitalized on, focusing on its quick response, 
agreement among its members, international support, and public trust. 
In the third chapter, I follow the events of the 2013-14 Euromaidan Revolution 
and show how within the span of only a few months, President Yanukovych was driven 
from office, Russia annexed the territory of Crimea, and two oblasts in the east of the 
country exploded into open revolt. I then argue that despite an increase in institutional 
knowledge, numerous additional years of experience in conflict management, and an 
established presence on the ground, the OSCE largely failed to positively influence the 
Euromaidan Revolution as a result of its slow response, a lack of international support, 
disagreements between its member states, and its growing public image problem, 




best features of the OSCE’s response and picking apart those that hampered its crisis 
management efforts. 
Finally, in the conclusion I bring these two examples together to argue in 
support of the OSCE’s unique potential as a means of crisis management, emphasizing 
its best practices of monitoring and mediation. I argue that thanks to its many missions 
on the ground, its consensus rule, and its extensive experience with crisis management, 
the OSCE should be afforded more attention by analysts and policymakers alike. 
Grounding my argument in the examples of Ukraine, I contend that greater support for 
the OSCE by its members, the public, and the international community at large would 
better allow the organization to positively influence delicate crisis situations. I close by 
suggesting a few specific changes which could boost the organization’s efficacy and by 





The OSCE as an International Organization 
 To understand the OSCE and its unique potential, it is necessary first to 
understand international organizations (IOs) and their potential usefulness more 
broadly. In this chapter I discuss IOs, explaining why states join such organizations and 
how they can be useful. From there, I explore the history of the OSCE as an 
international organization, showing how it has developed over the years and why it 
often does not receive sufficient credit for its past successes. I then present an overview 
of two of the OSCE’s best crisis response tools, monitoring and mediation, and explain 
how these tools can be used broadly to respond to crises. Finally, I argue that the OSCE, 
when taken in the proper context, is a useful international organization with a history of 
successful crisis response. I conclude with a brief discussion of some of the variables 
which threaten OSCE effectiveness. 
 
International Organizations and Their Role in Intrastate Crises 
Alternatively known as intergovernmental organizations, international 
governmental organizations, or simply international organizations, formal IOs take a 
wide variety of forms. They can range dramatically in size, scale, and scope of 
operation, from regionally-focused organizations (the Council of Europe, the Arab 
League, the African Union) to global institutions (the World Bank, the International 
Police Organization). Some focus on specific issues (the International Atomic Energy 
Agency) while others are much broader in scope (the United Nations). Some are 




(the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Many take a multi-vector approach, 
addressing multiple different focuses simultaneously. New organizations are created 
with relative frequency, and an IO can be shut down when its mission is viewed as 
“complete” or when its members decide the organization is no longer worth supporting. 
Other times these organizations reorient their priorities to maintain their relevance. 
Abbott and Snidal offer a range of possible IO functions, including “fact finding, 
early warning, and preventive deployment; mediation, adjudication, and other forms of 
dispute resolution; peacekeeping; sanctions and military force; impartial humanitarian 
assistance; and post-conflict rebuilding.”20 Though forms, tools, and focuses vary, 
Leverdier and Devin argue that at their core, all international institutions are in some 
way designed to reduce conflict and promote peace.21 This can be done directly (for 
example, through the use of military force) or indirectly (such as creating alternate 
dispute resolution channels). Despite many challenges throughout the evolution of IOs, 
the proliferation of international institutions globally has been a major driving force in 
moving the international system from a general state of negative peace (or an absence of 
violent conflict) to a positive peace (or a resolution of the underlying issues which lead 
to violent conflict). As Leverdier and Devin argue, “The history of international 
institutions is not one of a long series of failures, but of incremental changes that have 
defined legitimate representations of peace.”22 
                                               
20 Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Why States Act through Formal International Organizations,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no.1 (February 1998): 4.  
21 Roger Leverdier and G. Devin, Making Peace: The Contribution of International Institutions (London: 
Macmillan, 2011), 6. 




IOs are a type of international institution. Russet defines institutions broadly as 
“a set of channels for processing information, solving problems, and transmitting 
communications.”23 Essentially, IOs allow states to better coordinate and work together. 
According to Martin, “the entire point of institutions is to embody norms and rules, and 
thus induce more certainty and predictability in patterns of international interactions.”24 
By creating a mutually agreed upon framework for the specific issue a given institution 
is intended to address, states can enter into cooperation with greater confidence in the 
intention, methods, and goals of the cooperation. 
Studying international institutions and establishing with certainty their capacity 
to positively influence crisis situations can be challenging: “The issues surrounding the 
legitimacy of international institutions — their autonomy, their capacity for action, the 
effectiveness of their decisions — are all extremely tricky to resolve because they are 
hard to evaluate, measure, and interpret.”25 As a result of this complexity, a number of 
different schools of thoughts have developed within the study of international relations, 
including realism, liberalism, and constructivism, and many variation thereof. Each 
variation explanations the existence and growth of IOs differently. Despite these 
challenges of explanation, at the most basic level the very existence and persistence of 
IOs demonstrates their perceived usefulness. According to Keohane and Martin, 
“institutions are created because of their anticipated benefits.”26 The fact that 
                                               
23 Bruce Russett, International Regions and the International System (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press, 1975), 98. 
24 Lisa Martin, International Order and the Future of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 
1999), 9. 
25 Leverdier and Devin, Making Peace, 1. 
26 Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security 20, 




organizations like the UN and the OSCE have continued to persist for decades 
demonstrates that their member states perceive some value in their existence. 
States can engage with the international system in a number of ways. They can 
act bilaterally or within the framework of other formal or informal structures, including 
international treaties, decentralized multilateral cooperation, informational consultation, 
or through any number of other channels.27 Why then might a state choose to act 
through an international organization rather than through one of these other avenues? At 
a basic level, according to Abbott and Snidal, “participation in such organizations 
appears to reduce the likelihood of violent conflict among members.”28 By providing 
common expectations and non-violent means of conflict resolution, IOs allow states to 
deal with issues within a predetermined and mutually-supported framework. 
Further, Abbott and Snidal identify two key features that make IOs useful to 
member states: centralization and independence. IOs provide for a centralization of 
collective activities through a stable organizational structure backed by institutional 
legitimacy and a supportive administrative apparatus. This increases the efficiency of 
collective action and helps to bridge the gaps in the opinions and interests among 
member states.29 The independence of an IO often provides it with a special legitimacy 
to maintain a degree of autonomy in its actions. This allows IOs to serve as neutral 
parties and somewhat distance themselves from the baggage of any single member. 
According to Keohane and Martin, international organizations “facilitate cooperation by 
helping to settle distributional conflicts and by assuring states that gains are evenly 
                                               
27 Abbott and Snidal, “Why States Act,” 4. 
28 Ibid. 




divided.”30 As such, IOs can be used to build trust between member states and mitigate 
the risk of international action. 
Though IOs tend to be fairly constrained and limited in the actions they can 
take, they nevertheless reduce many of the transaction costs associated with a state 
engaging in the international system: “By taking advantage of the centralization and 
independence of IOs, states are able to achieve goals that they cannot accomplish on a 
decentralized basis. In some circumstances, the role of IOs extends even further to 
include the development of common norms and practices that help define, or refine, 
states themselves.”31 Beyond easing international action, participation in international 
institutions forces states to define and redefine themselves in the context of the broader 
international system in choosing what organizations and principles to support, where to 
make concessions, and what issues should be given priority. This collective identity 
building shapes both the states themselves and the broader international system, 
allowing for more consistent action, better communication, and less violent conflict the 
world around. 
 
History of the OSCE 
While this is neither an exhaustive history of the OSCE nor a complete 
description of all OSCE missions and functions, a brief overview of the organization’s 
founding, focus, and evolution over the last four decades will be useful in understanding 
its potential for diminishing intrastate crises.32 
                                               
30 Keohane and Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” 45. 
31 Abbott and Snidal, “Why States Act,” 29. 
32 For a more in-depth history of the OSCE, see Terrence P. Hopmann, Building Security in Post-Cold 




The origins of the OSCE trace back to the 1973 Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE). Convened as a multilateral forum for dialogue and 
negotiation between East and West, the CSCE saw 35 states representing both sides of 
the Cold War come together to discuss a number of prominent security issues at the 
time.33 According to Laursen, “the [CSCE] played an important role at the outset of the 
1970s in promoting detente between the East and West, getting the post-war borders in 
Europe accepted (an interest of the Soviet Union) and human rights acknowledged as 
international concerns.”34 Two years after that first gathering, the Helsinki Final Act 
was signed in August 1975. This act established the initial parameters of the conference, 
setting a comprehensive definition of security divided into three “baskets” or 
“dimensions”: the politico-military; the economic and environmental; and the human.35 
It also established ten fundamental principles to guide the behavior of its member states. 
Known as the Decalogue, this list contained a variety of commitments and basic 
tenants, including “sovereign equality, refraining from the use of force, inviolability of 
borders, territorial integrity of states, peaceful settlement of conflicts, non-intervention 
in internal affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and equal rights 
and determination of people.”36 Until the end of the Cold War, the CSCE continued to 
serve primarily as a forum for dialogue and as a norm-creation institution. Its primary 
                                               
Peaceworks no. 39, 1999) and OSCE, “OSCE History,” accessed March 1, 2018, 
http://www.osce.org/history. For a list of all OSCE missions and functions, see OSCE, “Survey of OSCE 
Field Operations,” and OSCE, “What Is the OSCE?,” accessed March 1, 2018, 
http://www.osce.org/whatistheosce/factsheet. 
33 OSCE, “OSCE History.” 
34 Finn Laursen, forward to The OSCE: Soft Security for a Hard World: Competing Theories for 
Understanding the OSCE, ed. Robert Dominguez (Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2014), 13. 
35 OSCE “What Is the OSCE?” 
36 Boyka Stefanova, “Institutionalist Theories: The OSCE in the Western Balkans,” in The OSCE: Soft 
Security for a Hard World: Competing Theories for Understanding the OSCE, ed. Robert Dominguez 
(Brussels: PIE Peter Lang, 2014), 60; The complete text of the Decalogue can be found at OSCE, 




tools were meetings and conferences which reviewed the implementation of and built 
on the commitments of the Helsinki Final Act. 
This changed with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. Suddenly with the Cold 
War over, the CSCE’s mission of bridging the East-West divide and reducing tensions 
was arguably complete. As the centralization of the USSR crumbled, however, many 
new challenges emerged across the region. Numerous national republics declared 
independence, and suddenly former command economies began the complicated 
transition to market economies. Democracies were established in some countries, while 
oligarchs or former Communist Party elite took over in others. Clashes over land, 
resources, and infrastructure were common. Questions of national identity and 
citizenship rose to the forefront of political debate in the region, and borders were 
uncertain. According to Zyla, by the 1990s the CSCE’s traditional tools for managing 
conflict were outdated and insufficient. Reform was need if the organization was to 
avoid being swept into the dustbin of history.37 
The Paris Summit of November 1990 was the first of a series of summits 
intended to reform the CSCE’s design and mandate. The December 1994 Budapest 
Summit saw the transformation of the CSCE from a series of conferences into a fully-
fledged international organization. The renamed Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) set out to tackle the security challenges that were 
arising with the changing times. According to Giulio, the members of the newly-formed 
OSCE lacked sufficient mutual interests for the organization to evolve in the direction 
                                               
37 Benjamin Zyla, “Soft Power: The Role of Canada in the OSCE,” in The OSCE: Soft Security for a 
Hard World: Competing Theories for Understanding the OSCE, ed. Robert Dominguez (Brussels: PIE 




of hard power or collective security, so instead it continued to focus on crisis 
management, soft power intervention, norm creation, and absolute gains among its 
members.38 According to political scientist David Galbreath, the OSCE has been a 
vocal critic of incomplete and failed transitions to democracy across the post-Soviet 
space and has worked since the Paris Summit in 1990 to develop a system of norms and 
institutions to help encourage democratization and civil society throughout the region.39 
As the organization evolved, so too did its tools. While annual ministerial 
gatherings are still held, so too are weekly Permanent Council (PC) meetings and 
Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) meetings at the organization’s Vienna 
secretariat. According to Stefanova, “although its fundamental principles of 
inviolability of borders and respect for state sovereignty were not modified, the 
conference recognized the connection between domestic political pluralism, respect for 
human rights, and regional stability.”40 From this evolving conception of security and in 
connection with the growing crisis in former Yugoslavia in the late nineties, the OSCE 
established a number of additional permanent structures over the course of the decade, 
including the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Representative on Freedom of 
the Media, and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA). Its toolbox also 
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expanded to include the creation of field offices, election observation missions, and 
other temporary missions and projects.41  
 Over two decades since its reorganization, the OSCE is now comprised of fifty-
seven member states operating from Vancouver to Vladivostok.42 It continues to 
function on the same three-prong approach to security (the three dimensions of politico-
military; economic and environmental; and human) and target a wide-range of issue 
areas including crisis management, human rights, national minorities issues, arms 
control, confidence-and-security-building measures, counterterrorism, environmental 
protection, economic issues, cyber security, and more. All member states have equal 
status and decisions are made by consensus on a political, but not legal, basis. Since the 
mid-nineties, the organization has operated thirty-four field missions, sixteen of which 
are active as of the end of 2017.43 Despite its widespread presence, large membership, 
and unique characteristics, according to Hopmann, the OSCE is often undervalued by 
US policymakers and the media and generally unknown to the US public.44 To 
understand why this is, one must delve into the question of OSCE effectiveness, 
examining its soft-power design, its best practices, and its past successes and failures 
along the way. 
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OSCE as an Effective International Organization 
 Evaluating the effectiveness of the OSCE is far from a simple task. The first 
challenge comes in establishing what constitutes a successful outcome. In the world of 
crisis resolution, success should mean peace, but establishing clear boundaries for what 
constitutes peace can prove quite difficult. For instance, standards of peace vary by 
location and situation and often even within the same conflict. Gidron et al. give the 
example of varying definitions of peace in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: “In Israel, the 
concept of peace was fraught with ambiguous meanings: for some it simply represented 
an amorphous notion of ending the occupation; for others it signified granting the 
Palestinians their national aspirations and developing normal neighborly relations with 
them.” 45 On the other side of the conflict, views among Palestinians were similarly 
complicated.46 Duration of peace is another important variable. Can a cessation of 
fighting be called peace once it lasts twenty-four hours? A week? A year? Even broadly 
speaking, peace can be broken up into different categories, such as negative peace (the 
absence of conflict) and positive peace (the resolution of the underlying causes of the 
problem).47 Though many scholars argue about what the common definition of peace 
should be, ultimately to determine if an outcome of a crisis can be categorized as 
peaceful (and thus a successful outcome), one must simply consider the conditions of 
the specific conflict and judge on a case-by-case basis. 
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 Accepting that peace is a relative concept, OSCE effectiveness continues to be 
difficult to analyze because often OSCE success means the prevention of crisis 
escalation, and it is impossible to measure that which did not happen. According to 
Hopmann, “The failures [...] make headlines. The successes can be uncovered by 
outsiders only with painstaking and difficult research about potential crises that never 
materialized.”48 This is further complicated by the challenge of establishing causality in 
complex social science situations and still further by the fact that the OSCE rarely 
works alone and instead functions best when its activities are coordinated with other 
regional, nongovernmental, and international organizations. 
 Finally, evaluating OSCE effectiveness can be a challenge because of the 
incredibly broad scope of activities the OSCE engages in, many of which are small in 
scale and long-term in duration. According to Hopmann, “The OSCE’s role often goes 
unrecognized, in part because it works in so many relatively obscure locations, and 
because most of its successes are the consequence of thousands of small 
accomplishments achieved day by day, village by village, rather than any single, 
dramatic result that can readily be pointed to.”49 The OSCE’s contribution to crisis 
resolution is rarely, if ever, to “solve” the crisis outright, but rather the OSCE functions 
best when it contributes to a broader crisis resolution effort by leveraging its unique 
position, experience, and best practices. As such, the challenge of quantifying OSCE 
influence over a situation can range from incredibly difficult to impossible. 
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 Despite these challenges, numerous scholars have found the OSCE to be 
effective within its niche in the international scene by examining its successes and 
failures on a case-by-case basis. According to Hopmann, “patient but often overlooked 
preventive diplomacy by OSCE missions and field operations has frequently made a 
significant contribution to the avoidance of violence in a number of potentially 
dangerous situations in the OSCE region, and that other conflicts have been moderated 
or prevented from escalating is further due to the rapid, but often unseen, work of these 
OSCE officials.”50 The key in analyzing OSCE effectiveness is in judging the OSCE for 
what it is (an intergovernmental soft-power organization) and to assess its activities 
against its own potential or that of similar organizations. Decrying the OSCE as a 
failure in a situation where no soft-power IO would reasonably have a chance of 
improving the situation is hardly fair or useful. 
  
The OSCE in Context 
 The OSCE is a textbook example of a soft power organization. Joseph Nye, who 
coined the term soft power, succinctly defines it as “the ability to get what you want 
through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”51 Where hard power relies on the 
use of military or economic force to either entice or coerce a target into taking a desired 
action, soft power is about making the target want to take the action of its own accord. 
Rooted in the idea of shared norms and values, “soft power uses a different type of 
currency (not force, not money) to engender cooperation--an attraction to shared values 
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and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values.”52 This is 
how the OSCE primarily conducts crisis management efforts. For the OSCE to take 
action in a given area, the state which controls that territory must be a member of the 
OSCE, which means that it has already signed onto the shared norms, values, and ideas 
expressed in the Helsinki Final Act and other foundational documents of the OSCE. 
 So what does this mean for the OSCE practically? As Stefanova explains, “the 
OSCE’s effects on the behavior of participating states and its actual resolution of 
conflicts remains limited, although its relevance as a focal point for debate and rule 
creation has been maintained.”53 Rather than resolve conflict by force or coercive 
diplomacy like the UN and NATO sometimes do, the OSCE’s primary role is that of an 
intermediary, a guide, and a communicator of relevant information. Dominguez adds 
that “the value added by the OSCE to international security lies in the instruments of 
soft security that complement rather than duplicate the current politics developed by 
NATO or the EU.”54 For all these reasons, the OSCE’s toolbox consists primarily of 
strategies based on persuasion, negotiation, information dissemination, and consensus 
among members. Further, it functions best when its efforts are in line with other soft- 
and hard-power organizations operating in the region. For example, because it lacks any 
form of security force, the OSCE must rely on its partner organizations (like NATO or 
the UN) to cover the hard power dimensions of conflict resolution and, when necessary, 
to provide security for OSCE monitors and personnel. Based on its soft power design, I 
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argue in this thesis that two of the OSCE’s best practices are its crisis monitoring and 
crisis mediation efforts. 
 
The OSCE’s Best Practices: Monitoring 
 As a soft power organization, the OSCE excels in areas of information 
exchange. One of its primary tasks in crisis management is frequently to ensure relevant 
information is available to and exchanged between otherwise often unconnected parties. 
According to Larive, “The OSCE plays a central role as a forum in order to foster 
partnership and cooperation between a wide range of actors: local governments, private 
and public sectors; international organizations; and countries.”55 In facilitating this 
information exchange, the OSCE allows for greater cooperation and coordination in 
addressing crisis situations. Zyla focuses on the active roles of the OSCE, emphasizing 
how it “has developed discrete but persuasive powers to mediate inter- as well as intra-
state conflicts and to monitor post-conflict situations by employing a set of symbolic or 
soft powers.”56 Building on exactly this idea, in this thesis I will examine how two best 
practices of monitoring and mediation were used by the OSCE to influence two 
intrastate crises in Ukraine to different levels of success. 
The OSCE’s crisis monitoring efforts can take a variety of forms and be 
deployed in a variety of contexts. Of these, its International Election Observation 
Missions (IEOMs) are perhaps its most frequent and consistent form of monitoring. 
Though instances of election monitoring can be traced back much further, Eric 
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Bjornlund argues that election monitoring as a global phenomenon exploded around the 
fall of Soviet Union: “Since the late 1980s, election monitoring has been a growth 
industry. There has been a dramatic increase in resources available from foreign 
assistance budgets for monitoring and otherwise supporting important elections in 
developing countries.”57 As election monitoring has become more mainstream, how it is 
conducted and by whom has also shifted: “Election monitoring has evolved from an ad 
hoc activity of largely America and European nongovernmental organizations and 
Western election experts, politicians, and academics into a routine, institutionalized 
function of multilateral organizations and professionals.”58 The OSCE represents one of 
the most prominent examples of this institutionalization.   
This shift in who conducts election monitoring was important in the elevation of 
the practice to a global standard. According Bjornlund, election monitoring is 
sometimes criticized as stronger democratic countries imposing their values and 
standards on weaker developing countries: “Critics often question who appointed the 
observers as arbiters of legitimacy.”59 The OSCE avoids this criticism, however, as the 
monitored country itself has both already signed on to the OSCE’s election standards 
first in becoming a member of the organization and then again by explicitly inviting the 
IEOM before each election (a requirement of membership). In fact, according to 
Bjornlund, since declaring the value of international election monitoring in its 1990 
Copenhagen document and organizing its first long-term monitoring mission for the 
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May 1996 elections in Albania, “the OSCE has become one of the leading 
intergovernmental organizations in democracy and election assistance.”60 
Susan Hyde argues that over the second half of the twentieth century the 
trajectory of election observation was a direct reflection of an increase in global support 
for democracy.61 Hyde responds to a seeming paradox where so-called pseudo-
democratic leaders willfully invite international election observers to report on the 
condition of domestic elections and then nevertheless willfully manipulate the election 
process, inevitably to be called out by the observers that they themselves invited, 
explaining this practice broadly through expectations: “The global movement toward 
democracy triggered a game between leaders seeking international benefits and 
democracy-promoting actors, ultimately resulting in the widely held expectation that 
leaders holding credible elections should invite international election monitors to judge 
them.”62 This changing norm of election monitoring has had much broader implications 
than simply an improvement in the conduct of elections. 
Though election monitoring may seem limited in scope, it often serves as a 
window to the broader political and human rights conditions of a state. When other 
democracies see reports of tampered elections, they may lose faith in that state’s 
government and refuse to offer other seemingly-unrelated assistance until observer 
complaints are dealt with. As Hyde explains, “now tied to broader international support 
for democracy, good governance, and political stability, inviting foreign observers has 
become linked to a variety of internationally allocated benefits, including membership 
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in international organizations, foreign aid, international investment, increased trade, 
tourism, normal diplomatic relations, and international legitimacy.”63 States which fail 
to meet the approval of election observers, or worse, who fail to accept their presence 
all together, risk losing access to some or all of these benefits and diminishing their 
standing internationally. By linking all of these benefits of international participation to 
the norm of election monitoring, democratic states have created a standard which not 
only allows but actually expects international monitors to be physically present on the 
ground during challenging political transitions. 
Election monitoring efforts allow IOs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
and other states to capitalize on a leader’s desires for the benefits of participation in the 
international system in order to gain access to often-otherwise inaccessible political and 
human rights information. Further, the norm of election monitoring actually creates a 
challenging situation where the pseudo-democrat can either invite the international 
observer and risk a negative report or refuse the observers altogether and effectively 
guarantee that the election will be seen as undemocratic.64 Once the observers are in the 
country, they serve the dual purpose of reporting internationally on conditions in the 
country and deterring some degree of electoral fraud through their presence: “Observers 
can deter fraud directly and therefore cost cheating parties a significant number of votes 
that they would have received in the absence of election observers.”65 Monitors also 
provide a powerful incentive for the administration conducting the elections to remain 
peaceful and refrain from cracking down violently on any protests that do occur. 
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One of the most important observations on election monitoring is that other 
states (particularly powerful democracies) have shown that they pay attention to the 
results. According to Hyde, “Not only do observers criticize elections, but [...] a variety 
of international actors began reacting to negative reports from observers by 
withdrawing international benefits or by refusing to reopen channels of foreign support 
following elections that did not meet international standards.”66 This international 
reaction is key to the value of observation missions. Pseudo-democrats are unable to opt 
out of inviting such missions because rejecting participation in this norm is generally 
viewed as an admission that elections will be illegitimate. When leaders instead invite 
observers and nevertheless tamper with the elections, the international community has 
been shown to respond negatively, demonstrating that on the whole the norm of election 
observation constrains the behavior of non-democratic leaders who still wish to 
participate in the international system. 
Along these same lines, I argue that all of the OSCE monitoring efforts, not just 
its election monitoring efforts, can have this same effect in crisis situations which have 
become or risk becoming violent. When a crisis occurs within OSCE jurisdiction, 
members sometimes propose the creation of a monitoring or observation mission in 
order to determine the scale of the crisis. Though each member state must formally 
invite the OSCE to conduct any mission within its borders, once the suggestion is on the 
table within an OSCE PC meeting, it becomes difficult for the target state to refuse. 
Refusal to invite a monitoring mission carries with it an implication of culpability. Once 
the observation mission is on the ground, it becomes much harder for a suspect 





government to control the flow of information into the wider world. If it is clear that the 
host government is supporting or perpetuating the conditions which caused the crisis, 
other states then have good reason to begin to act against that state (an act which can 
take a wide variety of forms from a simple denouncement to sanctions or a full-scale 
embargo). In this way, the OSCE can provide the “foot in the door” needed to allow for 
wider dissemination of accurate information on a crisis and the possibility of an 
international response. 
The idea of early monitoring is further supported by its potential for saved 
money and lives. Violent conflict prevention is far cheaper than crisis resolution.67 
Mustering support for the prevention of a crisis which has not happened yet, however, 
can prove challenging. As such, Wanis-St. John and Ghais argue that the first challenge 
of prevention is to identify conflicts in which violence is likely to occur.68 There are a 
few ways to identify conflicts at risk of becoming violent. One is to look at regions or 
groups statistically or historically prone to conflict and to try to predict ahead of time 
which areas are at the greatest risk. In situations where more rapid analysis is needed, 
however, qualitative reporting from organizations with regional specialization, 
including IOs, NGOs, the media, and academia, can be prove more valuable. The 
reports generated from these institutions (included those of OSCE monitoring missions) 
can help inform policy decisions and aid stakeholders in understanding how to best 
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respond to the crisis. Such assessments can be used in all phases of crisis management 
but are of particular value in prevention.69 
  
The OSCE Best Practices: Mediation 
As a crisis nears or crosses into violence, peaceful resolution becomes 
increasingly difficult without outside intervention. When a peaceful solution is desired 
but competing parties are unwilling or unable to achieve one, mediation can often 
provide a necessary step in deescalating the situation. Bercovitch defines mediation as 
“an accommodative process of conflict management whereby parties in a conflict seek 
the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, a state, or organization 
to settle their conflict or resolve their problem without resorting to physical force.”70 
Put more simply, mediation is negotiation conducted with the help of a third-party 
guide. As a method of dealing with conflict, mediation has a rich history in all 
cultures.71 It can be undertaken at any level of and in any kind of conflict (personal, 
regional, interstate, ethnic, etc.), can include any number of participants, and can engage 
with any number of issues underlying the conflict. The mediator may come from inside 
or outside the conflict and may be passive or active. Some scholars have argued that 
mediation is too relative a phenomenon to meaningfully describe in full: “the variables 
are so many that it would be an exercise in futility to attempt to describe typical 
mediator behavior with respect to sequence, timing, or the use or non-use of the various 
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functions theoretically available.”72 It is important to note that while mediation can take 
many forms, it is distinct from arbitration, in which the third party is tasked with 
rending judgment on the situation in order to resolve the conflict.73 Mediators, on the 
other hand, serve as neutral participants tasked with facilitating discussions and 
negotiations between conflicting parties. 
According Bercovitch, conflict mediation is more likely to occur when any of 
the follow four conditions are met: 1) the conflict has gone on for an extended amount 
of time, 2) the conflicting parties are at an impasse, 3) neither party wants to escalate 
the conflict or bear additional costs, or 4) both parties are willing to meet and engage in 
negotiation.74 Hopmann echoes this sentiment, noting that though parties typically 
prefer to settle their own issues without outside intervention, “often the dispute turns out 
to be so bitter, and novel solutions so difficult to discover, that they must turn to a third 
party to help them resolve their differences.”75 Outside mediators offer the hope of 
conflict resolution when local solutions prove insufficient. 
Oftentimes mediation is about reframing the debate and helping participants to 
find solutions they otherwise might miss. According to Hopmann, “sometimes the 
introduction of a third party may be one of the most effective and efficient ways of 
enabling the parties to make this transition from an essentially competitive, zero-sum 
orientation toward a more cooperative, positive-sum orientation, even while operating 
as always within the essentially mixed motive nature of international negotiations.”76 A 
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mediator often also plays the additional role of preventing further conflict escalation 
while a resolution is negotiated. 
Evaluating the success of mediation efforts can be difficult. Much like broader 
crisis resolution efforts, Bercovitch notes that “mediation outcomes are rarely clear-cut, 
and thus their evaluation may entail some judgmental accounts.”77 Some argue that “a 
successful outcome is one that is fair, efficient, wise, and stable” while others prefer to 
define mediation success “in terms of resolving the underlying issues of conflict and 
creating a durable self-supporting structure.”78 Success would also naturally be 
evaluated differently by the conflicts parties, the mediators, and any other third parties. 
Echoing Bercovitch’s methodology, in this thesis I consider mediation as successful “if 
it achieves an observed improvement in the disputants’ interaction.”79 For a ceasefire or 
a settlement to be considered successful it must last at least two weeks. 
What characteristics define a successful mediator? Hopmann argues that a 
successful mediator is often one which both parties view as neutral, fair, and impartial. 
The conflict participants must believe the mediator will take their preferences into 
account and not unfairly favor their opponent. It is not entirely about impartiality, 
however: oftentimes the perception that the mediator is confident, experienced, and able 
to get results can be just as, if not more, important.80 Some argue the third-party 
mediator should have enough power to influence conflict participants, however this 
crosses over into arbitration. Further, according to Hopmann, “power to manipulate an 
outcome may often be less important than the ability to facilitate the search process and 
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help the parties arrive at efficient, mutually profitable agreements.”81 This can be 
connected to the party having moral or legal standing in the international community or 
simply possessing widespread international support. With the support of its fifty-seven 
member states and twenty years of practical experience, the OSCE is a good example of 
a frequent mediator which enjoys widespread legitimacy in crisis mediation. Further, its 
neutrality and past successes can be seen as benefits in its mediation efforts.82 
 
OSCE Success and Failure 
 Despite the doubts cast by some policy makers and analysts, an in-depth 
examination of the OSCE’s past efforts reveals more successes than the organization 
often receives credit for and explains some of the failures it is most criticized for. The 
case of the breakup of Yugoslavia in the nineties provides a useful sampling of OSCE 
successes and failures. According to Stefanova, all of the OSCE’s primary functions – 
preventive diplomacy, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation – were active 
in the Western Balkans in the nineties.83 A short exploration of what went right and 
what went wrong will prove beneficial in examining the OSCE’s broader effectiveness 
over the remainder of this thesis. 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early nineties set off one of the largest 
geopolitical reorganizations in modern history. Moscow’s centralization broke down 
and new states largely organized along ethnic lines were declared across Eurasia. 
Yugoslavia at the time was a large southeastern-European communist state consisting of 
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six socialist republics (SR Bosnia and Herzegovina, SR Croatia, SR Macedonia, SR 
Montenegro, SR Serbia, SR Slovenia). On June 25, 1991, however, Slovenia and 
Croatia seceded from the communist state, a move which would lead to over a decade 
of violent struggles, war, border clashes, and genocide. By 2008, seven independent 
states (Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Slovenia, the Republic of 
Macedonia, Kosovo) shared the territory that was once Yugoslavia.84 
 This series of conflicts embodied much of what the new warfare of the post-
Cold War would look like: it occurred at a sub-state level, it was smaller in scale, it 
involved multiple non-aligned parties, and it was largely organized along ethnic lines. 
Because these conflicts ignited directly within the CSCE’s sphere of influence, the 
organization seemed the obvious choice to aid in the conflict resolution.85 Indeed, the 
CSCE was the first regional organization to react to the crises in the Western Balkans, 
setting up its first ever field missions when it established verification missions in 
Kosovo, Sandjak, and Vojvodina.86 Unfortunately, according to Stefanova, “although it 
was functionally prepared to address the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, it failed 
to act effectively due to the distribution of state interests, which shifted security 
responses and crisis management to other institutional actors.”87 In the first several 
years after fighting broke out, the CSCE failed to positively influence the conflict in a 
large part because it did not receive enough support from its member states.88 Zyla 
contests that the challenges went deeper than disagreements amongst members, 
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however, instead focusing on institutional problems the organization had yet to resolve: 
“the events in the Balkans soon proved that the CSCE lacked the institutional 
framework and capacity to effectively manage violent ethnic conflicts.”89 Indeed, the 
failure of the CSCE’s initial crisis response was one major factor in the decision to 
institutionalize the CSCE into the OSCE 
 Eventually the conflicts escalated past the point of soft power resolution and 
NATO stepped in, supported by US leadership, to push a hard power solution.90 After a 
sustained intervention, the Dayton Peace Accords were agreed to and brought with them 
a limited-but-notable degree of stability. To ensure the fair implementation of the 
accords, the agreement divided the responsibility of monitoring progress between 
several IOs. This was where the OSCE’s potential finally shined. It was tasked with 
building and monitoring the development of the institutions of liberal democracies, 
including election monitoring, human rights monitoring, and providing support for local 
civil society groups.91 According to Stefanova, “the OSCE’s role in crisis management 
was to provide good offices, issue Chairman-in-Office’s statements, apply coercive 
diplomacy, such as membership withdrawal, and facilitate direct negotiations between 
conflict parties under the Contact Group format.”92 This included the massive Kosovo 
Verification Mission, a monitoring mission comprised of 2000 unarmed OSCE verifiers 
protected by UN peacekeeping forces. 
 On the whole, though the OSCE failed to prevent the conflict from escalating, it 
should not be treated as an absolute failure because of the positive influence the 
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organization had in the post-conflict rehabilitation process. Further, it is not clear that 
any amount of soft-power intervention could have made a difference at the point the 
OSCE became capable of intervening, especially considering that the organization was 
still in the process of adapting to the new post-Cold-War world. Notably, according to 
Stefanova, Russia was much less cooperative in the OSCE after the NATO campaign in 
Kosovo, supporting the idea  that changing conditions on the ground affect how states 
engage with and utilize IOs.93 This is especially important in the case of the OSCE 
because as a result of the organization’s consensus-based design, any refusal to 
cooperate by member states can slow action to a crawl. On the whole, the situation was 
near intractable, and the OSCE was not equipped to deal with a crisis of its magnitude. 
Nevertheless, despite initial challenges, once it took on its NATO-assigned Dayton 
Peace Accord tasks, it performed them well. 
 One example of this can be seen in the OSCE mission to Skopje, the capital of 
the Republic of Macedonia, which, according to Hopmann, “played an instrumental role 
in preventing that former Yugoslav republic from falling into the kind of violence that 
has swept across Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo.”94 Further, in Croatia, the 
organization marked several victories. According to Zanotti, the OSCE was key in 
transforming the country “from a disorderly state into a disciplined member of the 
EU.”95 To do this, he argues the OSCE utilized a vast array of instruments from 
monitoring the implementation of national and international law through mediating 
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dispute resolution among social constituencies, offering assistance to minorities for 
repossession of their property, and developing a pluralistic media system. The 
organization's influence in Croatia has been widespread and, according to Zanotti, the 
OSCE “has been a key player in promoting normalization and pacification, in setting in 
place legal reforms aimed at making the government compliant with its international 
commitment, and in bringing Croatia closer to becoming a member of the EU.”96 Not 
only did these efforts prevent the country from descending deeper into violence, they 
helped to move the country away from a state of negative peace towards one of positive 
peace. 
 Further, outside of the Balkans, the OSCE achieved several other notable 
successes in the nineties. In Ukraine, for example, the OSCE employed its crisis 
mediation capacity to prevent Russian nationalists from seceding the territory of Crimea 
from Ukraine to Russia. According to Hopmann, the HCNM played a major role in 
promoting a non-violent outcome in a near-disastrous situation.97 This success may be 
even more significant than it at first seems, as it may have prevented a potentially 
devastating war between Russia and Ukraine in the nineties. “Needless to say, a war in 
the mid-1990s between Russia and Ukraine would have created a severe international 
crisis. [...] Even if this were the only accomplishment of the OSCE in the decade of the 
1990s, I would argue that this alone was worth all the effort and resources that have 
been put into the entire organization by the United States and its European allies.”98 
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Notable as it was, this was of course not the organization’s only accomplishment, but 
rather one of many. 
 Another example of semi-successful intervention came in the Russian republic 
of Chechnya starting in 1994. When the ethnically-distinct region initially tried to 
secede, Moscow immediately sent in troops to violently crack down on the attempt. As 
the violence grew, the OSCE sent in the OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya in 1995 
to monitor human rights violations. Its role quickly expanded, however, and it soon 
began serving as an active mediator between Moscow generals and Chechen separatists. 
After brokering a cease-fire between the two sides in 1996, Hopmann argues, “the 
OSCE assumed the major role in preparing, conducting, and monitoring the presidential 
elections in Chechnya in January 1997.”99 Though unfortunately the ceasefire broke 
down after three years and Second Chechen War began in 1999, these negotiation and 
monitoring efforts were nevertheless instrumental in ending the First Chechen War and 
saving an untold number of lives in the short term. Further, they played in an important 
role in improving the Russian stance toward the OSCE by offering the country an 
internationally-supported tool for resolving an explosive crisis within its borders. 
 Hopmann provides a few additional examples of the OSCE positively 
influencing various crises in Eastern Europe, though as these examples focus primarily 
on long-term democracy and human rights promotions, they are less applicable to an 
argument focused on crisis management through monitoring and mediation. According 
to Hopmann, “as one of a very few international institutions operating in Belarus, the 
OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group has played a vital role in providing international 
                                               




protection for NGOs and a severely restricted political opposition within that 
country.”100 Additionally, in Estonia and Latvia, “the OSCE played a significant role on 
behalf of large minorities of ethnic Russians denied citizenship rights in these Baltic 
states; indeed, these missions achieved sufficient results so that they were closed down 
at the end of 2001.”101 While it may not be directly comparable to the situations to be 
discussed in this thesis, these examples do provide useful support for the overall 
effectiveness of the OSCE and additionally help demonstrate why Russia has continued 
to value the organization as a valuable tool which can be used to support its geopolitical 
goals. 
 Despite the challenges of determining what constitutes a successful outcome and 
despite the limits of the organization, according to Hopmann “when one surveys all of 
the myriad activities that the OSCE has undertaken since the early 1990s in the field of 
conflict prevention and resolution, one cannot escape the conclusion that, in spite of all 
its shortcomings and failures, it plays a much more significant role than it is generally 
credited with.”102 This study will provide further support for this idea that, when 
properly supported, the OSCE can positively influence crisis situations. 
 
Conclusion: An Exploration of Best Practices Applied 
In the remainder of my thesis, I will show how the OSCE used its best practices 
of monitoring and mediation to positively influence the 2004 Orange Revolution. I will 
then go on to show that despite using the same practices during the 2013-14 
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Euromaidan Revolution, the OSCE’s impact on the crisis was greatly diminished due to 
a weaker cooperation among its members, weaker international support, weaker public 
trust, and a slower response time. Finally, in the conclusion I will use these two 
examples of Ukraine to argue that the OSCE has the potential to positively influence 
crisis situations within its area of operation by using its best practices of monitoring and 
mediation, but that its capacity to act is dramatically reduced when it lacks cooperation 
among its members, international support, public trust, or a reasonable response time. 
Cooperation among its members is important because without consensus, the 
OSCE’s ability to take action is greatly diminished. International support, including 
both material support in the form of personnel and funds and political support by its 
member governments, is necessary for the OSCE to maintain the logistical capacity to 
respond to crises. Public trust, both generally from the publics of its member states and 
specifically from the public in a crisis-affected region, is necessary for the OSCE to 
carry out its on-the-ground operations and for its efforts to be seen as legitimate. 
Finally, a reasonable response time is key in addressing the crisis before it escalates 
beyond the point of the OSCE’s capacity to handle. What constitutes an appropriate 
response time naturally varies depending on the specific conditions of the crisis, but in 
general, the quicker the response, the better chance the organization will have at 
preventing further crisis escalation. 
As discussed above, determining if a the resolution of a crisis is successful can 
be incredibly tricky. Though there exists no absolute standard of a successful outcome, I 




that thanks in part to the efforts of the OSCE, the outcome of the 2004 Orange 





The OSCE’s Influence on the 2004 Orange Revolution 
When Ukraine began preparing for its fourth-ever presidential election in 2004 
practically everyone expected the official results to be fixed, as they had been at 
previous elections in 1998, 1999, and 2002.103 The transition from the centralized 
socialist government of the Soviet Union to the ostensibly democratic government of 
independent Ukraine had not gone smoothly and corruption was rampant. Faith in the 
government was low, media censorship was high, and oligarchs exerted a 
disproportionate amount of influence on the Ukrainian government.104 The presidential 
and parliamentary elections of the nineties were rife with scandals, and there was little 
reason to expect the 2004 presidential election would go any differently. As it turned 
out, however, 2004 was a watershed moment for Ukrainian civil society.105 When the 
initial results of the vote were announced with obvious electoral manipulation, the 
Ukrainian people exploded into action, occupying the capital’s central square, Maidan 
Nezalezhnosti, and protesting until an election re-run was conducted. Evaluated as free 
and fair by a variety of independent international election observation missions, the re-
run elections put into power a protester-supported government which set to work 
reforming the Ukrainian state. Although many of the legal reforms passed immediately 
following the revolution were not long lasting and corruption continued to plague 
Ukraine in the years to come, the positive, peaceful outcome of the Orange Revolution 
                                               
103 Wilson, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” 26. 
104 Ibid., 21-22. 
105 For a deeper discussion of pre-Orange Revolution apathy and how it changed before, during, and the 
after the revolution, see Paul D’Anieri, ed., Orange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilization, Apathy, and 




was vital to the growth of civil society and the development of democracy in Ukraine. 
Without international support, however, it is unlikely that the protests would have 
turned out as they did.  
The OSCE, in particular, played a vital role in the international crisis 
management efforts both by monitoring the development of the revolution as it 
unfolded and by participating in the crisis mediation process. These monitoring and 
mediation efforts made accurate, unbiased information about the progression of the 
crisis internationally available, discouraged Kuchma’s administration from violently 
cracking down on the protesters, and facilitated the negotiation process between the 
disagreeing parties. This successful OSCE intervention was possible because at the time 
the organization possessed consensus among its members, international support, public 
trust, and an appropriate response time. 
 
On the Road to the Orange Revolution 
 The nineties were a turbulent time in newly-independent Ukraine. Although 
many viewed the collapse of the USSR as an incredible opportunity to build a 
prosperous and independent state, widespread uncertainty, lax oversight of the process, 
and a ‘winner-take-all atmosphere’ significantly hampered the implementation of 
reforms. While several elections were held during the country’s first decade, they were 
widely regarded as fixed and neither of the first two presidents proved lastingly 
popular.106 The first president, Leonid Kravchuk, was generally seen as corrupt, slow to 
act, and a relic of bygone Soviet days. His successor, Leonid Kuchma, quickly garnered 
                                               




a reputation as ineffective and corrupt. As his term went on, governmental corruption 
grew more overt. As Wilson notes, “after his questionable re-election in November 
1999, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma began a campaign against both media and 
civil society freedom.”107 Though he ruled from the center, Kuchma was generally 
regarded as giving preference to the Russian-speaking eastern half of the country, a fact 
which provoked further unhappiness among the underrepresented populace in the 
western regions.108 
By the end of the decade, the country was in poor shape by just about every 
metric. Living standards, foreign investment, foreign currency reserves, and gross 
domestic production were all down, while inflation, corruption, and bribery were on the 
rise.109 A large proportion of the media in the country was state controlled and even 
those which were independent were heavily censored. Kuchma’s administration brought 
with it an increase in power for the oligarchs and mafia while the average citizen saw 
little benefit from the state-led reforms.110 By the beginning of the 2004 election, the 
people of Ukraine were ready for change. 
 
A Botched Election 
 Unfortunately, the run-up to the October 31, 2004, election was marred by 
controversy. At first glance, the election appeared promising. Twenty-four candidates 
participated, representing multiple parties and a wide variety of views.111 In the end, 
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however, only two candidates, Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych, received 
widespread support. Yanukovych was the incumbent Prime Minister, while 
Yushchenko, according to the OSCE International Election Observation Mission 
(IEOM), was the face of the opposition and the leader of minority political coalition 
Our Ukraine.112 The two candidates were broadly characterized as the ‘political insider’ 
and the ‘political outsider,’ and both candidates worked to spin this generalization to his 
advantage. According to the IEOM, “A major theme in Yushchenko’s campaign was 
the characterization of the government as corrupt, and the need to enact anti-corruption 
measures if Ukraine was to join the European Union, a major policy objective of the 
Yushchenko campaign.”113 A vote for Yanukovych, on the other hand, was seen as a 
vote for stability and for the continuation of current policies. There was widespread fear 
Yanukovych would try to win the election through illegitimate means.114 
 As for the remaining candidates, only two represented parties which competed 
in the 2002 parliamentary elections, while the remainder campaigned on single-issue 
platforms or none at all.115 Though these ‘technical candidates’ were awarded the same 
rights and responsibilities as the two main candidates, they demonstrably did not have 
the same goals: according to the IEOM, “many of these candidates campaigned against 
Mr. Yushchenko rather than to promote their own platforms.”116 This both put 
Yushchenko’s campaign on the defensive and allowed Yanukovych to focus his 
campaign efforts elsewhere. Additionally, the inclusion of so many candidates increased 
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the workload of the election administration and made it more difficult to monitor the 
fair distribution of election resources. On the whole, many of the candidates were seen 
as either intentionally working to reduce the transparency of the election process or as 
unfairly targeting Yushchenko over any other opponent.117 
 The first two rounds of the election were heavily criticized almost across the 
board with major shortcomings at all levels of the election administration.118 As the 
IEOM remarked, “The nature of the election campaign prior to the first and second 
rounds raised serious concerns regarding the Ukrainian authorities’ commitment to hold 
democratic elections.”119 Transparency was one major issue. Both the Central Election 
Commission (CEC) and its regional counterparts, the Territorial Election Commissions 
(TEC), were generally regarded as operationally opaque and politically biased. Further, 
Kuchma’s administration actively worked to prevent domestic NGOs from monitoring 
the election. The election laws at the time were designed such that domestic 
organizations were barred from stationing observers at polling stations. The Ukrainian 
NGO the Committee of Voters of Ukraine subverted this law, however, by working 
with the OSCE to deploy thousands of observers accredited as journalists to document 
polling station conduct. Without these disguised observers, there would have been no 
independent domestic monitoring of the election, which likely would have given the 
administration in power considerably more control over the flow of information about 
the election.120 
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 Manipulation of the media was another of the most prominent issues throughout 
the election. While at first glance Ukrainian viewers appeared to have a wide variety of 
media choices, in reality information was much more centrally controlled. Though at 
the time of the election there were approximately 1,200 television and radio companies 
registered across Ukraine, according to political scientist Paul D’Anieri, “Ukrainian 
television, where over 75 percent of Ukrainians get their news, was largely owned by 
Kuchma’s government and his supporters.”121 The flow of information was primarily 
controlled through a daily ‘temnik’ issued by Kuchma’s government. Temniki were 
short daily bulletins (typically less than a dozen pages) sent from Kuchma’s 
administration to all major Ukrainian media outlets.122 They provided detailed 
instructions on what stories should be covered that day, as well as the slant the stories 
were to have.123 These temniki were used to control how much screen time each 
candidate received and how the media should characterize them. Through them, 
Kuchma’s administration was able to control the flow of information about each 
candidate and manipulate how they were portrayed. According to the IEOM, “In the 
run-up to the first and second rounds of voting, the campaign was largely rancorous, 
divisive and offered unequal opportunities for candidates to convey their messages to 
the electorate.”124 Media coverage was offered unevenly and dishonestly, and the 
manipulation could be traced directly back to Kuchma’s administration through these 
temniki. 
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 Manipulation of the law was another major issue. The IEOM recorded a number 
of irregularities in Ukrainian election laws, some of which hindered legitimate 
campaign efforts while others allowed for unethical practices to take place. One IEOM 
report noted that “some provisions are at odds with OSCE commitments and 
international standards” and that “unnecessary complexity of some provisions might 
have hampered implementation.”125 Vague terminology, an inconsistent application of 
laws, and limits on freedoms of expression were all also marked as issues.126 In April 
2004, six months before the election, a new Presidential Election Law came into effect, 
ostensibly based on previous OSCE recommendations, and was branded as solving 
these legal challenges. In reality, however, this law only addressed a limited number of 
concerns, was often applied restrictively by biased election commissions and lower 
courts, and contained several provisions that did directly contradicted OSCE 
commitments.127 In practice it was irregularly implemented and largely failed to affect 
the initial election. 
 Voter lists were another area of targeted corruption throughout the first two 
rounds of the election. Ukraine at the time lacked any sort of centralized voter registry, 
and the disorganization of voter registration was widely abused. According the IEOM, 
“In almost 40% of election districts, observers received reports directly from TECs and 
PSCs [Polling Station Commissions] on a variety of inaccuracies in the voter lists, such 
as the inclusion of names of deceased persons, failure to reflect changes of citizen’s 
residency, instances of multiple registrations, large numbers of misspellings of names of 
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citizens or streets and a few examples where all voters living in the same building were 
omitted from lists.”128 Such gross inaccuracies raised questions about the actual 
representativeness of the vote and undermined the legitimacy of the election on the 
whole. 
 
The Orange Revolution Unfolds 
The first round of voting took place on October 31st, 2004. The official results 
declared Yushchenko as the narrow winner with 39.87% of the vote and Yanukovych 
with 39.32%.129 Only three of the twenty-two other candidates garnered more than 1% 
of the vote. Because no candidate surpassed the fifty-percent requirement, a runoff 
election was scheduled for November 21st.130  As per Ukrainian election law, only the 
two highest-ranked candidates in the first round were allowed to participate in the 
second round. Candidates were given only ten days before the second round to 
campaign, and according to OSCE election monitors, no official action was taken to 
address any of the issues noted during the first round of voting.131 When Yanukovych 
was reported on November 24th as winning 49.46% of the votes compared to 
Yushchenko’s 46.61%, many doubted the legitimacy of the results. Notably, “prior to 
announcing the results, the CEC failed to consider a large number of official complaints 
filed by the Yushchenko campaign [and] four CEC members refused to sign the official 
protocol of results.”132 Despite these complaints, the CEC indicated its intentions to 
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move forward and publish the results of the election. With the regular channels of 
dissent non-functioning and even the election officials calling the vote into question, the 
protests began the very next day.  
 On election night, Yushchenko called his supporters to Kyiv’s Maidan 
Nezalezhnosti to follow the tabulation of exit polls. When the results revealed a dubious 
Yanukovych win, Yushchenko condemned the elections as rigged and called upon his 
supporters to remain in the square until new results were released. Over the next several 
weeks, hundreds of thousands of protesters occupied the central square, with many 
setting up tents and sleeping in the square despite sub-zero winter temperatures.133 
According to Wilson, the demonstrators were highly organized and drew extensively on 
the lessons learned from previous attempts to organize similar protests.134 Remarkably, 
the protests were virtually bloodless. International attention on the revolution combined 
with a politically divided security force meant Kuchma’s administration was unable to 
employ violent means to break up the demonstrations. 
 Over the next two weeks, the country slipped deeper and deeper into crisis. The 
parliament met frequently and the only consensus was a consensus of disagreement. In 
the west of the country, a number of regional governments announced they would not 
recognized Yanukovych as president no matter the outcome of the election and several 
even adopted resolutions recognizing Yushchenko as president. In some eastern and 
southern regions, on the other hand, local leaders expressed indignation at the protests 
and, most alarmingly, “at a conference in Severodonetsk (Luhansk) attended by Mr. 
Yanukovych, some regional governors began discussing proposals for the autonomy of 
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some eastern regions, if Yushchenko won.”135 With the country at risk of falling into 
civil war, outside intervention was needed to prevent further escalation of the crisis. On 
November 26, a roundtable (moderated in part by the Secretary General of the OSCE) 
was organized to break political deadlock and begin resolving the issues which had 
sparked the protest. 
Naturally Yanukovych opposed the re-run of the election, decrying such a move 
as violating Ukrainian law.136 His party fought to gain official recognition for the 
suspect results so that he could be sworn in as president and his administration could 
take power. As the debates continued, however, the Supreme Court blocked the 
publishing of the election results, preventing Yanukovych’s inauguration. Yushchenko, 
on the other hand, filed a number of complaints to the Supreme Court. According to the 
IEOM, a televised, open and transparent five-day hearing was held to adjudicate his 
complaints. In the end, “the Supreme Court concluded that the CEC acted unlawfully in 
determining the final election results and established that a number of significant 
violations of the law and the Constitution had taken place before, during, and after the 
21st of November.”137 In order to resolve these issues, it was deemed necessary to hold 
a repeat of the second round vote, scheduled to be conducted on December 26th. 
Additionally, the parliament went to work addressing some of the concerns ignored 
after the first and second rounds of voting. Their efforts included adopting a number of 
temporary amendments to the presidential election law to boost electoral transparency 
and the dissolution and reformation of the entire CEC. 
                                               
135 OSCE, “Ukraine Presidential Election 31 October,” 31-32. 
136 Steven Pifer, “European Mediators and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” Problems of Post-Communism 
54, no 6 (Nov/Dec 2007): 33, doi:10.2753/PPC1075-8216540603. 




Less than three weeks later, with a newly amended presidential election law on 
the books and a new staff in the CEC, the rerun of the runoff ballot took place in what 
former US Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer called “the most closely monitored 
election in Ukraine’s history.”138 According to the IEOM, the re-run second round saw 
improvements almost across the board: “[The] conduct [of the repeat second round] 
brought Ukraine substantially closer to meeting OSCE commitments. In contrast to the 
two previous campaign periods, fundamental freedoms and civil and political rights 
were largely respected.”139 The new CEC was considered generally more effective and 
more transparent. Media coverage was much improved, with news outlets providing a 
wider-variety of opinions while outright rejecting government censorship by refusing to 
adhere to the guidelines of the temniki. There were fewer incidents of voter 
intimidation, a decrease in recorded abuse of state resources to alter voting outcomes, 
and fewer complaints filed overall.140 According to the IEOM, “observers assessed the 
process much more favorably than the two previous rounds.”141 
When the polls were closed and the final vote tabulated, Yushchenko emerged 
as the winner with 51.99% of the vote and Yanukovych trailing far behind with 
44.20%.142 Though Yanukovych tried to have the election results thrown out (despite 
his earlier claims that such a move would be unconstitutional), the Supreme Court 
found no validity in his complaints and the results were allowed to stand.143 On January 
23, 2005, Viktor Yushchenko was sworn in as Ukraine’s third president.144 Though 
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naturally Yanukovych supporters resented the election outcome, the re-run of the runoff 
was viewed both domestically and internationally as legitimately representing the will 
of the majority of the people of Ukraine. 
 
The OSCE: Monitoring and Mediation 
 To prevent further escalation and to assist in the peaceful resolution of the crisis, 
the OSCE capitalized on its international support and its IEOM already on the ground to 
draw attention to the crisis as it unfolded, to make accurate information available to 
relevant decision makers, and to prevent Kuchma’s administration from cracking down 
on the protesters. To support a peaceful resolution, the OSCE joined in the negotiation 
process, leveraging its crisis mediation experience and its unique role as an IO with a 
wide membership to help bring the conflicting parties to the table, encourage a timely 




 As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the OSCE’s greatest strengths lies 
in its monitoring capabilities, bolstered by its continuous presence on the ground in its 
field operations across Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia.145 In 
order to participate in the OSCE, each member state is required to invite OSCE election 
monitors to report on the administration of any national elections which take place 
within the country. In Ukraine’s case, the combination of an active IEOM and the 
                                               




permanent office of the Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine (PCU) allowed the OSCE to 
react immediately to the Orange Revolution as it unfolded. These monitors provided 
incredibly valuable information which played a role in both preventing further crisis 
escalation and in facilitating the eventual peaceful resolution of the crisis. 
 The IEOM for Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election initially consisted of 636 
observers from 33 OSCE participating states.146 When the runoff election was declared, 
the IEOM’s mandate was extended and 563 observers remained to monitor the 
election’s second round. When voters began to protest the illegitimate election, the 
IEOM’s mandated was extended once again, and when a rerun of the second round was 
scheduled for December 26th, the OSCE expanded the IEOM to include 1,372 
observers from 46 OSCE participating states. At the time, this was the largest IEOM 
ever deployed by the OSCE.147 
In addition to representing all 57 member states of the OSCE, IEOMs work 
closely with other regional security and political organizations in order to openly and 
efficiently monitor events. In this case, the IEOM worked with delegations from the 
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (PACE), the European Parliament (EP), and the Parliamentary 
Assembly of NATO (NATO PA). This both increased the IEOM’s logistical capacity to 
report on events and bolstered the legitimacy of its reports by increasing participation 
and input. Election monitors were also sent by the International Republican Institute, 
the Tel Aviv Institute for the Countries of Eastern Europe and CIS, and the 
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Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).148 Notably, the OSCE is the only of these 
organizations which counts Ukraine, Russia, the EU, and the US as members, providing 
it with a degree of legitimacy and international support for reporting which these other 
organizations lack. 
IEOMs monitor and report on events on the ground as they unfold. In addition to 
tracking the administration of an election as it is held, observers arrive in the host 
country several months prior to a given election in order to monitor the political and 
social climate of the country and report on election preparations and on candidates’ 
campaigning. In this situation, the IEOM identified a large number of issues (as listed 
earlier) which would contribute to the eventual unrest. This is important because when 
the crisis began, this information was readily available and the process of addressing 
these concerns was thus considerably expedited. Additionally, when the election results 
were called into question, the opposition was able to point to these documented issues 
and the lack of their resolution as support for throwing out the fixed election results. 
According to the OSCE, IEOMs use “a long-term, comprehensive, consistent, 
and systematic election observation methodology” to fairly and honestly evaluate the 
validity of an election.149 At the conclusion of an election, they issue both a report of 
how the election proceeded as well as suggestions on what can be improved in the 
future. IEOM methodology is based on a combination of research, best practices in the 
field of election monitoring, and its experience gained from monitoring over 230 
distinct elections over the last two decades.150 The IEOM post-election 
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recommendations are key for establishing accountability and a sense of continuity. They 
diminish the opportunity for host governments to claim ignorance of problems and 
encourage said governments to make positive changes by illuminating problematic 
areas. The rigorous, data-driven nature of IEOM reports boosts their credibility and 
makes it more difficult to misinterpret their findings. Before the second round of voting, 
the IEOM noted that “although these concerns were set out in the IEOM’s preliminary 
statement after the first round of voting, the State authorities did not take remedial 
action, and continued to lend strong support to Mr. Yanukovych. Consequently, the 
campaign was unequal and unfair.”151 By establishing clear actions the Ukrainian 
government could take to improve the legitimacy of its elections (recommendations, it 
should be noted, which are to some degree implicitly supported by all fifty-seven 
members of the OSCE, each of whom had to approve the IEOM’s initial deployment), 
the OSCE provided reason to call the administration’s intentions into question and 
prevented it from claiming ignorance of the issues plaguing the 2004 elections. After 
the eventual conclusion of the election, the IEOM issued a series of fifty-nine 
recommended changes which it determined should be addressed before the 2006 
parliamentary elections. 
 Support for the idea that the IEOM’s reports were key in the successful 
resolution of the crisis are widespread: “Reports by international governmental and non-
governmental organizations on the 2004 presidential elections in Ukraine constituted a 
significant factor in generating, facilitating, and completing the Orange Revolution.”152 
Wilson argues that “in the election year, [the OSCE] played a prominent role in 
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monitoring the voting progress.”153 Ibryamova goes further, writing that “the 
presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004 in the Orange Revolution are but one example 
of the positive impact OSCE election monitoring can have.”154 Galbreath makes the 
boldest assertion, asserting mildly at first that “in general, the OSCE made an important 
contribution to the 2004 election results,” but going on to argue that the IEOM’s report 
was the “push” Ukrainian society needed to spring into action.155 Without the 
international condemnation of the election, Galbreath suggests the protests would not 
have experienced the same massive turnout. Several Western governments also made 
explicit the connection between the information provided in the reports of the IEOM 
and the decision to condemn the election. In one example, the chairman of the US 
Helsinki Commission, Representative Christopher Smith, wrote in January 2005: 
“Peaceful popular protests backed by OSCE standards on elections can bring down 
entrenched corrupt regimes that rely on fraud to remain in power.”156 A USAID 
publication from the time also expressed support for OSCE standards and IEOM reports 
as a legitimate basis for protest.157 In one final benefit of the IEOM, Vorobyova argues 
that the mission’s positive effect on civil society began even before the crisis ignited: 
“Because of the preparations to monitor the elections and to provide awareness 
campaigns, civil society in the countries that experienced electoral revolutions [such as 
Ukraine] has grown more mature and confident in its power as well as more rational 
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and strategic in its activities.”158 Although OSCE IEOMs and OSCE monitoring efforts 
in general do not by design engage with the crises they are tasked with tracking, they 
nevertheless play a vital role in enabling other relevant actors to take informed action in 
response to crises. 
 
Crisis Mediation 
 While monitoring efforts are incredibly important for preventing escalation and 
providing the information needed for peaceful crisis resolution, monitoring alone cannot 
resolve crises. Information is a key tool necessary for conflicting parties to reconcile 
their disagreements, but it can only provide limited help when said parties are unwilling 
to work towards resolution at all. This is where the OSCE’s crisis mediation efforts 
make a big difference. Leveraging its role as independent and supported by all of its 
fifty-seven members, the OSCE has on numerous occasions served as the middleman in 
intense negotiations and crisis resolution efforts. Some of these occasions have included 
the Minsk Process to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the Transdniestrian 
settlement process in Moldova, and the Geneva International Discussions targeted at the 
2008 crisis in Georgia.159 
In 2004, these mediation efforts took the form of three round table talks which 
occurred over the course of the crisis. The first of the discussions remarkably took place 
just five days after the second round results were released. All three meetings included 
representatives from the Ukrainian government, representatives from both 
Yanukovych’s and Yushchenko’s factions, the presidents of Poland and Lithuania, the 
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EU High Representative on Common Foreign and Security Policy, the Chairman of the 
Russian Duma, and the Secretary General of the OSCE.160 This diversity of 
participation was intended to make the talks as representative and effective as possible. 
Each facilitating party faced different constraints. According to Pifer, the EU 
representative was not able to be as involved as he might have liked because at the time 
he was working on developing the EU-Russia relationship and “was sensitive that a 
misstep in Kyiv could have negative repercussions with Moscow. The Russian factor 
also appears to have weighed on the calculations of those European leaders less inclined 
toward EU involvement in Ukraine.”161 The presidents of Poland and Lithuania, on the 
other hand, participated most enthusiastically in moderating the negotiations, but were 
hindered by perceptions that they were biased in favor of their own countries’ national 
interests. The OSCE representative therefor played an important role in ensuring 
balance. According to Pifer, while the primary credit for the successful resolution 
belongs to the two sides which successfully reached an agreement, “the international 
mediators nevertheless played an important facilitative role [and] helped the Ukrainian 
leaders find a settlement more rapidly than might otherwise have been the case.”162 
The mediators positively impacted the negotiations in a number of ways. First, 
they worked to prevent both sides from escalating the situation. On the side of the 
administration, they strongly discouraged the use of force for dealing with the 
protesters: “They provided a counterweight to--and gave Kuchma political cover for 
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resisting-- those in Yanukovych’s camp who wanted a crackdown.”163 The mediators 
also discouraged the protesters on both sides from provoking the authorities and 
escalating the crisis while negotiations were taking place: “They persuaded 
Yanukovych’s team to abort a miner’s march that could have led to clashes with Orange 
demonstrators, and they consistently pressed Yushchenko’s camp to reject suggestions 
from more radical elements to seize government buildings.”164 Had the conflict 
escalated to violence while negotiations were taking place, a peaceful resolution would 
certainly have been more difficult to achieve. 
Second, the mediators were the ones to actually launch the negotiating process: 
“No Ukrainian negotiating process had emerged between November 21 and 26, despite 
calls from Kuchma and other for talks. There was simply no trust between the opposing 
camps. The presence of European mediators proved a prerequisite for negotiations: 
Yushchenko agreed to meet with Yanukovych and Kuchma only in their presence.”165 
Without the presence of outside mediators, it is impossible to say how long the two 
sides would have taken to come to the table. Once there, the mediators played the vital 
role of keeping the conversation going and keeping the negotiating parties at the table. 
Finally, had the mediators not engage, the crisis could have dragged out far longer. 
According to Pifer, “A longer crisis, even with the best of intentions, would have 
carried the risk of a misstep that triggered violence.”166 
In short, the mediators played a key role in resolving the crisis by creating the 
framework for the negotiating process, keeping pressure on the all parties to continue 








working for a peaceful resolution, and providing a strong disincentive against escalating 
the situation by all sides. The negotiations resulted in a settlement on December 8th 
which included reforming the CEC, amending the questionable presidential election 
law, and an agreement on a series of constitutional reforms.167 This was a dramatic 
victory for the protesters and included significant concession from Kuchma’s 
administration. According to Pifer, “The Orange Revolution was a Ukrainian 
phenomenon, and Ukrainians deserve the bulk of the credit for its peaceful resolution. 
The key negotiations took place in Ukrainian channels, and Ukrainians made the 
compromises that ended the crisis. But European mediators, who took part in three 
roundtable meetings, played an important facilitative role.”168 The OSCE’s participation 
in the discussions allowed for assistance from other regional actors (the Polish and 
Lithuanian presidents, for example) without undermining the credibility of any 
decisions. Emphasizing the OSCE’s positive impact in the Orange Revolution, Pifer 
goes on to suggest that “similar crises may arise in the western CIS and that the [OSCE] 
could use its experience in Ukraine as a model for managing such situations in the 
future.”169 The OSCE’s mediation efforts during the Orange Revolution should serve as 
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Factors Enabling OSCE Effectiveness in 2004 
Although the OSCE has proven experience positively contributing to crisis 
management and resolution efforts, because of its unique consensus nature and its soft 
power tool kit, the organization needs consensus among its members, international 
support, public trust, and an appropriate response time in order to make a difference 
 Agreement among members is clearly incredibly important in taking action as 
the OSCE is run on a consensus basis. Without consensus, very little be do done. As the 
Orange Revolution was targeted at preventing the Russian-supported Yanukovych from 
claiming victory in the fraudulent election, there was some fear Russia would block 
OSCE action in order to support its preferred candidate. Though Russia had already 
expressed discontent at the OSCE’s characterization of the fraudulent Georgian election 
results after that country’s 2003 Rose Revolution, it had not yet escalated its protest to 
the point of delaying OSCE action. As such, it and its regional allies continued to 
support OSCE action through the crisis, allowing for the organization to continue to be 
involved. Noting the improvements made between the November 21 and December 26 
rounds of voting, the IEOM noted, “These measures stand in stark contrast to the 
previous votes, and demonstrate that when a clear political will is evident to conduct an 
election in line with OSCE commitments, much can ultimately be achieved in a short 
time period.”170 The lesson here is that above all else the OSCE is a collection of 
member states, and without the support of those member states, meaningful crisis 
response becomes much more difficult. 
                                               




Public trust is important for the OSCE to carry out its mission, for ensuring 
access to all necessary locations, and, most importantly, for its efforts to be seen as 
legitimate by the affected populations. Without public trust, IEOM observers face 
increased difficulty in performing their monitoring duties. While no public opinion polls 
were conducted in Ukraine at the time to measure public perceptions of the OSCE, 
public trust can be seen in the access the organization was afforded, the seriousness 
with which voters took the IEOMs election criticisms, and the fairly widespread support 
for further European integration for Ukraine at the time. The OSCE itself actually 
identifies enhanced public trust as one of the many benefits that IEOMs can produce.171 
 International support is key for the OSCE to prevent accusations of bias, to 
apply international pressure to prevent the local government from cracking down on 
protesters, to pressure all sides to continue to work for a solution. Besides the approval 
of all fifty-seven members before it acted, the OSCE enjoyed international support in 
several additional ways. First, the IEOM worked closely with the OSCE PA, PACE, the 
EP, and the NATO PA, issuing a combined election observation report and benefiting 
from the combined institutional weight of all these organizations. Further, the IEOM 
itself was comprised of observers from forty-six OSCE member states.172 Finally, the 
efforts of the OSCE benefited tremendously from immediately international support for 
its election reports. Western capitals began to react publicly on November 23 and 
several, including the US and the Netherlands speaking for the EU, referred to the 
OSCE IEOM report to condemn the election as illegitimate.173 This public support is 
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incredibly important, because as a soft power organization, the OSCE has limited 
capacity to act on any issues it identifies. Its IEOM efforts are most effective when they 
empower other states and organizations to move forward with crisis resolution. 
 In terms of response time, the organization benefited greatly from already 
having staff on the ground at the time of the crisis. Based on its philosophy of long-term 
observation, the IEOM was established a full two months before the first round of 
elections, with 77 long-term observers deployed to monitor the run-up to the election, 
636 OSCE observers present for the October 31 first round, 563 observers present for 
the November 21 second round and 1,372 observers for the final December 26 rerun of 
the second round.174 By having long-term observers present before the start of the crisis, 
combined with the permanent PCU in Kyiv, the organization was able to respond 
rapidly to the crisis as it unfolded, providing reports on the crisis almost immediately 
after it began and joining in the crisis mediation efforts just five days after the 
annulment of the initial second round. Though the OSCE can be hindered by its 
consensus design, several loopholes allow for action even as debate proceeds in Vienna. 
Most notably, ODIHR operates administratively independent of the organization’s 
Vienna secretariat, and though IEOMs must be approved by all member states in order 
to be initially dispatched or officially extended, once in country IEOMs do not need to 
seek continued PC approval before issuing individual reports. OSCE staff may also be 
dispatched to engage in crisis mediation without full approval in the PC. The 
organization’s quick response was key in halting further escalation of the crisis and 
especially in preventing a descent into violence while a solution was worked out. The 
                                               




dramatic increase in the number of observers after November 21 made a strong 
statement on the OSCE’s commitment to supporting a fair and meaningful resolution to 
the crisis.175 
 
Conclusion: Crisis Averted 
 The Orange Revolution was unequivocally one of the most important events in 
the history of modern Ukraine. The explosion of popular discontent could have easily 
sent the country spiraling into a self-destructive cycle of protests and crackdowns 
possibly leading to civil war, but instead, thanks to international intervention and the 
support of the OSCE, the conflicting parties were brought together with accurate 
information on the state of affairs in order to reach a peaceful resolution. The Orange 
Revolution was a success not only for its general lack of violent conflict and the free 
and fair elections it produced, but also for the long term cultural and civil society 
changes it inspired. 
 According to OSCE reports, meaningful reform could be seen occurring even 
before the December 26 rerun of the botched second-round vote. Referring to the 
changes implemented after the conclusion of the third OSCE-mediated roundtable, the 
IEOM noted that “the improvement was most clearly demonstrated in the media 
coverage, the overall conduct of the campaign and the transparency in the CEC 
performance, including the immediate publication of polling station results.”176 
Notably, these were two of the areas with the most issues prior to the OSCE-led 
mediation efforts. Further, according to Besemeres, Ukrainian elections over the next 






decade were viewed as more free and fair, a fact which he connects to the success of the 
Orange Revolution.177 
 The positive effects of the revolution’s peaceful conclusion extend well beyond 
improvements in election administration. As Besemeres explains, “These [gains from 
the Orange Revolution] are actually considerable, and can’t be reduced to the 
judgement that the presidential and other elections on Yushchenko’s watch have been 
pretty clean. On a range of international indices of socio-political progress, Ukraine has 
improved its position in the first years after the Orange Revolution, whereas Russia 
declined.”178 He goes on to note that “on the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (which 
examines a range of socioeconomic and governance issues), Ukraine went from 44th 
place in 2003 to 37th in 2010 (Russia from 41st to 65th). On Freedom House’s freedom 
of the press index, Ukraine went from 68th in 2004 to 55th in 2009 (Russia from 67th to 
80th), and other related indices recorded a similar pattern. For comparison, Reporters 
without Borders indices had Ukraine on 51 in 2004 (0 would be ideal), and 22 in 2009 
(whilst Russia declined from 51 to 61).”179 While naturally none of these indices are 
one hundred percent accurate or unbiased, in aggregate they paint a picture of a 
reforming and improving Ukrainian state, an image that becomes particularly stark 
when framed against Ukraine’s increasingly repressive neighboring government. 
Indeed, in one incredibly strong example, freedom in the media (notoriously poor in 
pre-Orange Revolution Ukraine) improved so much after the crisis that a number of 
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prominent Russian journalists actually relocated from Russia to Ukraine to practice 
their craft in a safer and more free environment.180 
 Finally, several scholars have argued that that the Orange Revolution reshaped 
Ukrainian civil society and political culture in a central way. According to Galbreath, 
“while the political settlement after the Orange Revolution has often been fractious, the 
nature of politics and the government’s relationship with society had fundamentally 
changed.”181 Writing a decade after the end of the revolution, Solonenko agrees, 
arguing that “Ukrainian civil society, despite still suffering from a lack of sustainability, 
difficulties in effectively influencing the reform process and reaching out to the people, 
and an over-dependence on external funding, has made an important qualitative leap 
since the days of the Orange Revolution.”182 Vorobyova adds to the conversation, 
writing, “It can be observed that several impediments to democratic development have 
been removed as a result of the protest.”183 According to Vorobyova, the protests 
challenged the norm of election rigging and media censorship in Ukraine. The 
revolution empowered citizens and inspired hope that participation in civil society could 
make a meaningful different in the country. Today Ukrainian civil society is more 
organized and consolidated, seeing itself as a fully-fledged actor in the reform process 
and demanding inclusion in policy-making. This is a far cry from its almost non-
existent status prior to the Orange Revolution. As Vorobyova argues, “the achievement 
of the Orange Revolution was not only in reaching its immediate electoral goals but also 
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in awakening civic activism and consciousness in a new generation who is likely to 
transmit their democratic values and orientations into the future”184 In short, the 
successes of the Orange Revolution went far beyond the facilitation of a single free and 
fair election. 
 In the end, thanks to its consensus among members, international support, public 
trust, and quick response time, the OSCE positively impacted the 2004 Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine by monitoring the development of the crisis in real time and 
assisting in crisis mediation efforts. Rather than trying to directly solve the problem (a 
task for which the organization is not suited), the OSCE focused on providing 
information to all parties, facilitating dialogue among those in disagreement, and 
preventing further escalation of the crisis until a resolution was reached. Thanks to its 
wide inclusive membership and international support, this was a role only the OSCE 
could have played.  
                                               





The OSCE’s Influence on the 2013-14 Euromaidan Revolution 
Systemic corruption cannot be eliminated overnight and though the new 
Yushchenko administration engaged in anti-corruption efforts and strengthened ties 
between Ukraine and the EU, the challenges of reform coupled with divisions within the 
governing coalition proved too great and reform progress was slow. Frustrated by the 
lackluster pace of change, the people of Ukraine voted Viktor Yanukovych into the 
presidency in February 2010. Popular support for his administration was fleeting, 
however, as government corruption continued to grow and Yanukovych's administration 
pushed itself further and further from Western Europe. Nearly nine years after the start 
of the Orange Revolution, protesters again occupied Maidan Nezalezhnosti en masse in 
order to express their opposition to the government’s actions. Within the span of only a 
few months, Yanukovych fled from office, Russia annexed the territory of Crimea, and 
two oblasts in the east of the country were in open revolt. In spite of numerous 
additional years of experience in conflict management and the use of its proven 
monitoring and mediation capabilities, the OSCE largely failed to positively influence 
the 2013-14 Euromaidan Revolution as a result of its slow response, its lack of 
international support, disagreements between its member states, and its growing public 
image problem, especially in relation to the SMM. 
 
On the Road to the Euromaidan Revolution 
 With the dust of the Orange Revolution settled, the new administration set out 




Ukraine. Unfortunately, over his six-year presidency, Yushchenko was unable to 
achieve meaningful political reform largely due to infighting within the governing 
coalition.185 Though the final elections which brought the Orange Revolution to a close 
were applauded both domestically and internationally, by the end of Yushchenko’s 
presidency, his administration did not enjoy the same praise. According to political 
scientist Dmitry Gorenburg, “Under Yushchenko, the regime shifted from Kuchma’s 
oligarchic authoritarianism to a defective democracy that was lacking in political 
participation, political competition, and adherence to constitutional norms.”186 The new 
administration either would not or could not effectively tackle the widespread 
corruption plaguing the country and the political elite of the time spent more time 
competing for power than working for change.187 
 Yushchenko’s bloc continuously lost support over the course of his presidency, 
earning a progressively smaller percentage of the vote in each parliamentary election. 
When it came time to elect a new president in 2010, the people of Ukraine were so 
disillusioned, they elected the suspect candidate of the Orange Revolution, Viktor 
Yanukovych, into office. As to how this happened, Gorenburg contests the voters chose 
‘the lesser of two evils,’ opting for predictability over the promise of reform: “Although 
there were concerns about the rollback of various rights and freedoms, Yanukovych’s 
promise of stability was convincing for the majority of the electorate.”188 As it turns 
out, Yanukovych’s rule would prove to be far from stable. 
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 Upon gaining power, Yanukovych set to work undoing the reforms made by 
Yushchenko’s administration. The biggest changes were in Ukraine’s foreign policy. As 
noted earlier, Ukraine has faced great uncertainty in balancing its East-West relations 
since the fall of the Soviet Union. Despite a growing support for stronger integration 
with Europe among the majority of Ukrainians, Yanukovych favored Russia and 
Russian-backed institutions.189 Throughout his term as president, Yanukovych 
expressed great hostility toward European institutions in general and especially the 
OSCE, a fact that should come as little surprise due to its role in rescinding his 
fraudulent 2004 electoral victory.190 
As soon as he entered office, Yanukovych began to roll back the 
Europeanization pushed by Yushchenko’s government. One of the most notable 
changes came in 2014 when his administration refused to sign a planned Ukraine-EU 
Association Agreement, which would have significantly enhanced Ukraine’s economic, 
political, and social ties to the EU.191 As Ukrainian historian Serhy Yekelchyk explains, 
“Popular dissatisfaction with the corrupt regime had been mounting for years, and the 
sudden diplomatic turn from Europe to Russia was simply the last straw.”192 According 
to most academic analysis on the subject, the primary factors which drove disgruntled 
citizens to the streets included frustration with the poor economic state of the country, 
the perpetuation of corrupt systems, and widespread disillusionment with the 
government as a result of continued failed reforms.193 Yanukovych’s regime abandoned 
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its proposed economic and political reforms shortly after gaining power, choosing 
instead to focus on amassing personal wealth for those in power. One of the major 
political changes they did push through, however, was the removal of the 2004 
constitutional and legal reforms put into place following the Orange Revolution.194 
Most of the government officials appointed between 2004 and 2010 were also replaced. 
Faced with an unresponsive government and several clear steps backwards, citizens 
again took to the streets. 
 
The Euromaidan Revolution Unfolds 
Although dissatisfaction was mounting, widespread disillusionment with the 
failures of the Yushchenko administration combined with a broader political nihilism 
made the idea of a second nationwide revolution seem entirely unrealistic. According to 
Ukraine expert Tetyana Bohdanova, not five months earlier the leading opposition 
parties in the country had tried to organize just such an uprising and failed 
spectacularly, attracting just 20,000-30,000 supporters based in opposition strongholds 
compared to the 100,000 demonstrators the organizers had hoped would appear across 
the country. Though the popular discontent was present, Bohdanova suggests a lack of a 
significant catalyst stymied these demonstrations. Unknown to the organizers at the 
time, Yanukovych would provide that catalyst less than half a year later.195 
 On the night of November 21st, nine years to the day after the start of the 
Orange Revolution, discontented Ukrainians again took to the streets, with a crowd of 
2,000 participants on the first night ballooning to somewhere between 50,000-300,000 
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protests within the span of a few days.196 As the protests grew, they attracted 
increasingly diverse participants and spurred growing political polarity. A large amount 
of the tension could be traced back to disagreements between pro-Western and pro-
Russian camps and these tensions began to appear in popular media, slogans, and songs. 
One of the most dramatic manifestation of this opposition came in the destruction of 
physical monuments constructed during the Soviet Union, a clear rejection of Ukraine’s 
Soviet past and its ties to Russia. Of these, monuments to Lenin were the most-common 
targets with 504 monuments of Lenin knocked down during 2014 according to the 
Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance.197 This destruction underscores the deep 
resentment many Ukrainians felt towards Russia and their desire for closer ties with 
Europe. 
Initially led by opposition and pro-EU figures, the protests attracted a wide 
range of participants, including celebrities, politicians, and even popular music groups 
who performed nightly to entertain and encourage protesters.198 As crowds continued to 
grow, the unrest spread across the country, first to European-leaning cities like Lviv and 
then across the country. A major turning point occurred on November 30th when riot 
police cleared Maidan Nezalezhnosti using tear gas, stun grenades, and batons. 
Reportedly employing excessive force, the riot police were seen chasing down and 
beating unarmed protesters, assaulting journalists, detaining non-protesting civilians in 
the vicinity of the square, and even jamming cell networks to prevent demonstrations 
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from reforming.199 Rather than crush the spirit of the protesters, this aggressive 
crackdown further stoked the rage of the populace, and hundreds of thousands more 
turned out to protest in the coming weeks, as demonstrators built barricades and the 
Internal Troops (Ukraine’s national guard) were called in. At its height, attendance was 
estimated to have reached somewhere between 400,000-800,000 demonstrators.200 
Notably, despite the violent nature of the administration’s crackdown on 
protesters, relatively little international attention was focused on the demonstrations. 
Some analysts attributed this to a sentiment referred to as ‘Ukraine fatigue,’ a term 
coined by Steven Pifer to describe a sense of frustration and exhaustion among Western 
policymakers with the slow pace of reform in Ukraine.201 The lack of action from the 
West and the OSCE specifically was particularly damning, however, as Ukraine held 
the OSCE’s rotating chairmanship that year and the organization's annual ministerial 
conference was taking place in Kyiv that very December. Even as police violently 
cracked down on demonstrators, the meetings continued, with only a small coalition of 
10 EU-member-state ambassadors and the then Secretary-General of the OSCE, 
Lamberto Annier, meeting briefly with protesters to discuss events.202 Noting this lack 
of meaningful action, the protesters clamored for international support, seeking 
legitimacy. According the protester-run website Euromaidan Press, despite some 
dramatic declarations, little meaningful action was taken: “Euromaidan asks the EU, the 
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USA, and other countries to intervene by imposing sanctions on Ukraine’s government 
leaders and Ukraine’s oligarchs. It is frustrated with the slow action (and ineffective 
words) of world leaders in helping to de-escalate the situation.”203 
 According to protest leaders, as the demonstrations grew in size and support, 
Yanukovych’s government sought to undermine their efforts by employing street 
hooligans, known as “titushki”, to provoke violence and undermine the legitimacy of 
the protests, with some reportedly going so far as to kidnap reporters and hospitalize 
protesters.204 At the same time, the government rapidly pushed anti-protest laws through 
parliament, threatening demonstrators with years of jail time and thousands of dollars of 
fines if they were caught on the street. These efforts again backfired and demonstrations 
only grew. Though a few opposition figures in government took it upon themselves to 
serve as mediators between the occupiers of Maidan and parliament, according to 
Euromaidan Press, they did not accurately represent the interests of the demonstrators 
and many remained skeptical of both their intentions and their capacity to effectively 
mediate due to their proximity to the situation.205 
As protests stretched into the new year, Yanukovych became increasingly 
desperate. In a futile bid, he first tried placating protesters by sacking his prime minister 
and pushing through amnesty laws for those who agreed to leave Maidan. When these 
measures proved entirely unsuccessful, the government again reverted to force.206 From 
there, violence escalated, reaching a peak on February 20th with as many as 67 
                                               









demonstrators killed and nearly 1000 wounded by government snipers and Berkut in 
one night.207 As it turns out, these were the last ditch efforts of a desperate autocrat, and 
only a day later Yanukovych left office to flee to Russia. A number of his allied 
ministers and politicians departed as well.208 Yanukovych's Speaker of Parliament 
resigned along with several of his contemporaries and the remaining parliamentarians 
formed an interim government, reinstating the country’s 2004 post-Orange-Revolution 
constitution and scheduling emergency presidential elections for May 25th of that 
year.209 Though this dramatic resolution should have brought an end to the crisis, 
disagreements over the legitimacy of the new government, a lack of substantive support 
from the West, and increased Russian aggression instead further escalated the situation. 
 
Crisis Escalation: The Annexation of Crimea and War in the Donbass 
As the new government began preparing for emergency elections and much-
anticipated political reform, conflict grew in the eastern regions of the country. Though 
the protests were widely supported across Western Ukraine, many in the East had voted 
for Yanukovych and viewed his departure as an illegal coup. On top of this, many 
ethnic Russian living in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine professed fear of repression under 
their new European-oriented government. Having supported Yanukovych through two 
presidential elections and his botched presidency, Russia viewed the ousting of his 
administration and the resultant political changes as a significant threat to its foreign 
policy and international interests. Whether supporting its ethnic diaspora or protecting 
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its geopolitical interests, the Russian government sent in unmarked armed men to begin 
taking control of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea only a week after Yanukovych 
fled office.210 
Under Ukrainian control since 1954, the territory of Crimea has long played an 
important strategic role to Russia, serving as home to both the country’s Black Sea Fleet 
in the city of Sevastopol and to a significant population of ethnic Russians. Though the 
territory is the ancestral home of the Crimean Tatar people, as a result of Stalin-era 
ethnic cleansing coupled with the popularity of the peninsula as a retirement spot for old 
Soviet military officers meant that at the time of Euromaidan, well over half of the 
territory’s population was ethnically Russian, and the region had backed pro-Russian 
candidates since the dissolution of the USSR.211 As a result, when unmarked soldiers 
seized government buildings, organized a regional independence referendum, and 
declared the territory to be a part of Russia, many locals reportedly supported the 
annexation. Despite this supposed support, the lack of international observation of the 
referendum has led many to question the legitimacy of its 93% in-favor result. 
Not long after the annexation of Crimea, men with the same unmarked uniforms 
and Russian military equipment began to appear across Eastern Ukraine. Working with 
already-discontented locals, these unidentified Russian-speaking soldiers armed with 
Russian military equipment began taking control of government buildings, building 
barricades, and installing pro-rebel officials into office. Lacking popular support in the 
East, the new Ukrainian government was unable to reign in these dissenters, and before 
long two self-proclaimed states emerged from the discontented regions—the Donetsk 
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People’s Republic (DPR) and the Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR). Fearing the loss of 
more territory, the Ukrainian government initially attempted to carry out “anti-terrorist” 
operations against the rebellious region, but their botched efforts instead dramatically 
exacerbated the tension, effectively escalating the conflict to the point of a civil war.212  
As tensions rose, so did the scale of the tragedies occurring. In one of the most 
dramatic displays of aggression, Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) was shot down, 
killing all 283 passengers and 15 crew members on board. Though Russia and 
representatives from the DPR and LPR contest its findings, an international Joint 
Investigation Team found that the aircraft was shot down with an anti-aircraft missile 
transported from across the Russian border and fired from rebel-controlled territory. 
After the MH17 incident, Western government imposed economic sanctions on Russia, 
but these measures proved ineffectual, and over three years later, the conflict rages on 
with casualties numbering in the thousands.213 According to a resolution in the US 
Congress, “the Russian Federation has provided military equipment, training, and other 
assistance to separatist and paramilitary forces in eastern Ukraine that has resulted in 
over 4,000 civilian deaths, hundreds of thousands of civilian refugees, and widespread 
destruction.”214 Many on both sides blame the lack of effective Western intervention for 
the continuation of the conflict. Even when Russia annexed Crimea, writes Euromaidan 
Press, “world leaders voiced their concern but took no action.”215 The sanctions came 
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too little too late, material support was lacking, and nothing offered by the West came 
close to the support Russia offered the rebel groups. What really was needed from the 
start of this conflict, and especially after the deposition of Yanukovych, was an 
unbiased, internationally-support mediator. 
 
The OSCE: Action and Inaction 
While the OSCE positively impacted the outcome of the Orange Revolution, it 
failed to achieve a similar influence in the Euromaidan Revolution despite the added 
benefit of numerous additional years of crisis management experience. While its various 
monitoring efforts and its support for peace talks again offered promise, in contrast to 
its efforts during the Orange Revolution, the OSCE’s influence was weakened by its 
slow response, disagreements among its members, diminished international support, and 
decreased public trust. 
 
Monitoring Missions 
Despite the permanent presence of the PCU in Kyiv and an awareness of the 
crisis as it unfolded, the OSCE did not organize its first monitoring mission until early 
March, more than three months after the start of protests. According to Stefan Lehne, 
the first OSCE monitoring missions were proposed on February 24 when the OSCE 
chairman in office Didier Burkhalter addressed the UN Security Council and called for 




this address, the organization began sending its first observers to Ukraine. It then built 
on this momentum, dispatching five separate missions by the end of the year.216 
The first mission was organized on March 4th, just over a week after 
Yanukovych fled from office. Activating a clause in the 2011 Vienna Document, the 
new interim government requested an observation mission consisting of representatives 
from any and all OSCE participating states in order “to dispel concerns about unusual 
military activity.”217 This mission was notable because it is a rare example where OSCE 
member states can act within the organization without consensus approval. From March 
5 to 12, 18 OSCE participating states (all NATO members) sent a team of 35 unarmed 
military personnel to report on conditions on the ground.218 Though this marked an 
important first step, the mission was limited in scope and was prevented from entering 
the Crimean Peninsula by occupying forces, reducing its effectiveness. 
The second mission, officially dubbed the OSCE National Dialogue Project, was 
dispatched on March 20th. According to a press release from the OSCE, “the project 
[aimed] to contribute to a peaceful and sustainable political transition in the country and 
to immediately address problematic issues through supporting a national, inclusive and 
impartial dialogue throughout Ukraine.”219 Involving fifteen international experts 
traveling to five locations over four weeks, the National Dialogue Project was 
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essentially created to gather information and lay the groundwork for eventual crisis 
resolution efforts, including negotiations between the new government and the rebelling 
oblasts.220 
The third mission, also established on March 20th, was the IEOM for the May 
25th early president elections. Although IEOMs are typically deployed in country 
several months before the election, in this case the OSCE had just two months from the 
establishment of the mission to the holding of election. Despite this short turn around, 
over 1,200 long-term and short-term observers from 49 OSCE member states were 
deployed to Ukraine to monitor the election.221 On the whole, the IEOM characterized 
the election as hastily organized and challenged by divisions within the country, but 
ultimately free, fair, and sufficiently representative. According to the IEOM, “the 
Central Election Commission (CEC) operated independently, impartially, collegially, 
and generally efficiently, and met all legal deadlines, despite the challenging 
environment, the limited lead time and the changeable legal framework.”222 Compared 
to previous Ukrainian presidential elections, the 2014 emergency presidential election 
was noted to have a number of improvements: “Unlike in previous elections, the 
OSCE/ODIHR EOM observed no cases of misuse of administrative resources, and 
interlocutors did not raise it as an issue of concern.”223 Further, freedom of the media 
was greatly improved over every previous presidential election. There was also stronger 
inclusion of domestic NGOs and improved candidate registration. Unfortunately, 
because of the security issues in the country, the campaign period only lasted two weeks 
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and only nine of the twenty-one registered candidates were able to conduct visible 
campaigns. 
The IEOM rightly emphasized the significance of holding free and fair elections 
as a tool of conflict resolution, but noted that the severity of other events in the country 
diminished its effectiveness: “This presidential election was seen by a majority of 
national and international actors as an important first step in the de-escalation of a tense 
situation. At the same time, while the election featured in the political discourse, it was 
eclipsed by events in the east and the role of the Russian Federation in that part of the 
country.”224 Notably, the IEOM was able to call out Russia’s actions in the eastern 
oblasts because IEOM reports do not need to be approved by consensus in OSCE PC 
meetings. Despite the challenges of the election, it was a key step in the crisis resolution 
process, as it established the legitimacy of the new government in Kyiv. Further, the 
IEOM’s monitoring played a key role in establishing the legitimacy of these elections, 
preventing Russia or any other state from attempting to invalidate the election results. 
This can be seen in Russia’s reversal on its official opinion of the election after the 
OSCE report was released. According to Yekelchyk, Russia initially condemned the 
preterm presidential election as illegitimate but ultimately changed its position and 
recognized the outcome.225 Much the same as in 2004, despite clearly disliking the 
results of the election, Russia was unable to outright reject the results because the 
OSCE’s election monitoring efforts were internationally-supported, transparent, and 
implicitly supported by Russia through its OSCE membership.  In response to the 
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Euromaidan Revolution, the OSCE election monitoring mission was a key step in the 
crisis resolution efforts. 
The fourth mission, by far the largest and most complex of those sent, was the 
SMM. Though it took until March 21 to establish a mandate for the SMM, the first 
monitors were on the ground within twenty-four hours of the decision, demonstrating 
the OSCE’s capacity for rapid response when its member states agree.226 An 
unprecedented undertaking of the OSCE, the SMM was initially tasked with covering 
the whole of Ukraine, though it was ultimately prevented from entering Crimea and 
some parts of the DPR and the LPR. According to Sammut, “The SMM's main role is to 
be the eyes and ears of the international community, giving decision makers a clear 
picture of what is happening on the ground.”227 Composed of over 700 monitors from 
44 OSCE participating states, the SMM was sent as a follow-up to the first two missions 
to report on the security environment, monitor the humanitarian situation, facilitate the 
delivery of humanitarian aid, assist in establishing local dialogues, and track the 
implementation of any ceasefires.228 The SMM issues a variety of reports, including 
Daily Reports, which track ceasefire violations and crisis escalation, and Thematic 
Reports, which address large trends within the crisis. At the time of writing the SMM is 
the only independent observation mission allowed in rebel-held territory and continues 
to serve as the primary source of impartial reporting on the progression of the crisis. 
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Beyond being notable in its scope and rapid deployment (after its mandate was 
approved), the SMM was remarkable simply for its unprecedented nature. According to 
Sammut, “The complexity of the situation, the size of the Mission and the context in 
which it is operating makes it the precursor of possible future OSCE deployment in 
other similarly sensitive areas, such as in Nagorno-Karabakh and Georgia, where the 
OSCE has been involved for many years and where the prospect that it may be asked to 
provide either a peacekeeping force or a large monitoring force remains.”229 To put it 
another way, the SMM has not only been important for the information it has provided 
on the ongoing crisis but additionally for demonstrating the potential capabilities of the 
OSCE in addressing future crisis-resolution efforts.  
Lastly, the fifth and final mission, poetically titled The OSCE Observer Mission 
at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk, was authorized on July 24th to 
observe two border checkpoints between Russian and the rebel-occupied territories of 
the DPR and LPR in Eastern Ukraine.230 Working closely with the Russian government, 
a team of approximately twenty civilian monitors supported by a local staff was tasked 
with recording any unusual cross border activity. This was based on concerns of 
Russian citizens and soldiers crossing the border to fight with the Ukrainian separatists. 
This mission turned out to be a largely symbolic move, however, as the ability of the 
monitors to examine cargo or speak with travelers was greatly restricted. Monitors were 
only allowed to observe travelers as they crossed the border and briefly visually inspect 
the cargo area of trucks traveling through the checkpoint. They were not allowed to 
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speak with any border-crossers or physically search passing trucks. Further, this mission 
was restricted to observing just two of eleven of border crossings, covering a total of 
two kilometers of the four-hundred-kilometer-long border.231 Moscow has blocked 
every proposed expansion of the mission’s coverage.232 With nearly three hundred 
kilometers of the border left unmonitored, many analysts have doubted this last 




 With monitors on the ground, the OSCE slowly but surely set to work 
employing its other most effective tool, crisis mediation. Drawing on its inclusive 
membership and experience from past successful negotiations, the organization brought 
together various stakeholders in a series of resolution efforts which culminated in the 
signing of the ambitious-but-ultimately unsuccessful Minsk II agreement. Though this 
final series of talks did produce a ceasefire agreed upon by all parties, SMM reports 
have shown little to no compliance with the specifics of the agreements from the DPR 
and LPR. Furthermore, the OSCE’s slow response meant that this ceasefire was not 
agreed to until more than a year after the start of the crisis, after thousands of casualties 
had already occurred. Had the organization capitalized on its established reputation for 
crisis mediation to address the unrest when it first began, it would have faced a less-
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complicated and less-intractable situation and may have been able to facilitate a more 
peaceful resolution to the crisis. 
The first attempt at negotiating a resolution did not occur until a full six months 
after the start of the crisis when, shortly after the May elections, a group of world 
leaders met on the sidelines of an event memorializing the 70th anniversary of D-
Day.234 From this group, the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine was formed and 
included Russian and Ukrainian representatives as participants and Heidi Tagliavini, 
special representative of the OSCE General Secretary, as moderator. Despite several 
meetings, because no representatives from the breakaway regions were present, this 
coalition ultimately failed to reach a meaningful agreement and a new forum for 
discussion was needed. According to Lehne, two additional efforts spearheaded by EU 
foreign ministers also failed because Russia felt excluded from the talks.235 
The second OSCE-supported attempt at negotiating a settlement came later that 
year on September 5 in Minsk, Belarus. Incorporating lessons learned from the failure 
of the first negotiations, this second attempt included all of the parties from the 
Trilateral Contact Group and was expanded to include representatives from the DPR 
and LPR. This time Ukraine was represented by former president Leonid Kuchma. In an 
attempt to avoid legitimizing the separatists and their cause, however, the Ukrainian 
government refused to grant Kuchma and the representatives of both republics official 
status in the negotiations.236 Despite this lack of official recognition, this was the first 
effort at negotiation which included representatives from the separatist regions. Though 
                                               
234 Yekelchyk, The Conflict in Ukraine, 155. 





the discussions were more comprehensive than the first attempt, ultimately the 
Ukrainian government and the rebel groups were unable to establish common ground 
and this attempt failed as well. 
The third and final attempt began on February 11, 2015, nearly a year after 
Yanukovych fled office and fourteen months after the start of the crisis. This time the 
stakes were raised as the OSCE invited the heads of state of several nations in order to 
address the crisis at the highest level. The new Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko, 
Russian president Vladimir Putin, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and French 
president Francois Hollande came together with Tagliavini again serving as mediator. 
By all accounts Tagliavini played a vital role in bringing the opposing sides together in 
dialogue: “Tagliavini helped stave off a collapse late in the talks, according to officials 
who were there. As someone Putin has long felt he could trust, diplomats say, she was 
able to silence a contingent of separatists who wanted to see the whole deal 
reworked.”237 These talks, dubbed Minsk II, were incredibly in-depth, covering 
everything from the frequency of patrols allowed along the line of contact to the caliber 
of weapons each side could maintain. Unfortunately, though all parties signed the 
eventual agreement, neither side fully supported its implementation in practice. 
Ceasefire violations quickly became a daily occurrence and fighting in breakaway 
territories continued.  
It would be easy to dismiss all of these crisis resolution efforts as failures for 
their lack of lasting results, but that would be overlooking the significant role they have 
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played in advancing dialogue and establishing the extent of the conflict. Of all of the 
efforts to end the post-Euromaidan conflict in Ukraine, the only negotiations which 
included parties representing the West, Russia, the Ukrainian government, and the 
separatists were those moderated by the OSCE. Because of this, they are the only 
negotiations which can reasonably claim to have represented all stakeholders. Indeed, 
before the OSCE began serving as a mediator for the conflict resolution efforts, hope 
for a productive agreement was slim. Four-state talks which occurred in Geneva without 
OSCE guidance, for example, were labeled by one analyst as “a case of the EU-US 
grabbing at straws to keep diplomacy alive.”238 Without an inclusive space to discuss 
the conflict and an experienced mediator to guide the talks, peaceful resolution to the 
conflict becomes much less realistic. 
 
Factors Inhibiting OSCE Effectiveness in 2013-14 
 Although the OSCE did employ its best practices of monitoring and mediation 
in response to the 2013-14 Euromaidan Revolution to monitor the progression of the 
crisis and to bring together the conflicting parties to negotiate a peaceful solution, the 
organization simply did not act fast enough to have a similar positive effect as it did in 
2004. By the time the OSCE became involved, the crisis had escalated beyond a point 
that the OSCE is equipped to handle. The effectiveness of its efforts were further 
diminished by its lack of transparency and diminished public trust compared to 2004. 
The OSCE’s slow response was connected to both an initial lack of international 
                                               





support for it to become involved in Ukraine and then by conflict within the 
organization among members which led to a lack of consensus. 
As detailed above, the OSCE did not deploy its first monitoring mission until 
March 2014, over three months after the first protesters began gathering in the Maidan. 
Notably, in order to monitor the initial development of the crisis, the OSCE did not 
even need to deploy an observation mission, but rather could have relied on its PCU in 
Kyiv to begin tracking the crisis in the same way that the IEOM already on the ground 
in 2004 immediately began issuing reports on the evolving Orange Revolution. 
Although the PCU did issue regular reports to the OSCE PC, these reports were not 
made available outside of these meetings and thus their potential benefit was diminished 
by their limited distribution.239 Where the OSCE’s publicly-available reports in 2004 
were vital in discouraging Kuchma’s administration from violently cracking down on 
protesters, Yanukovych was not initially constrained by the same international pressure 
in 2013-14. Further, though after the departure of Yanukovych the PCU did begin a 
series of dialogue initiatives, titled “Reconstruction through Dialogue,” with the hopes 
of mediating crisis de-escalation on the local level, these efforts have not been 
connected with the state-level negotiations also mediated by the OSCE, a fact which has 
raised doubts about the initiatives’ potential for long-term effectiveness.240 
The OSCE’s sluggish response cannot be connected to a lack of awareness of 
the revolution as it unfolded, evidenced, as noted above, by the annual OSCE 
ministerial conference being held in Kyiv at the same time as the protests. Even with 
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OSCE representatives witnessing the protests unfolding firsthand, it took a full three 
weeks and four PC meetings before any participant state mentioned the unrest on record 
within the OSCE PC.241 In comparison, the issues of the emerging Orange Revolution 
were debated in the PC just four days after the spark of those protests in 2004.242 This 
points to a broader initial lack of international support for OSCE-led crisis resolution. 
Analysts generally agree that early on in the Euromaidan crisis, the US and the 
EU were averse to becoming involved, a fact often attributed to Pifer’s theory of 
Western ‘Ukraine fatigue.’243 While the EU initially tried to tackle the problem 
unilaterally, conducting limited negotiations with Yanukovych’s regime, its efforts were 
seen as unrepresentative and ineffective by protest participants. In spite of these efforts, 
Marples asserts that “the EU and the United States had largely failed to influence the 
course of events in the later stages.”244 Onuch agrees with this assessment, noting that 
“informally, Ukrainian political insiders have complained about Europe’s and 
America’s lack of initial interest and then later mismanagement of the Euromaidan 
crisis.”245 This stands in contrast to the rapid international support provided during the 
Orange Revolution in 2004. 
Despite these complaints, there is meaningful support within Ukrainian civil 
society for the international community to take a larger role in crisis resolution efforts, 
with a large number of civil society organizations (CSOs) openly supporting greater 
international involvement. One extensive survey of these organizations conducted by 
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the OSCE found that “CSOs hope that the international community will support conflict 
resolution, dialogue and the reform processes through capacity-building. This can be 
achieved by bringing best practices from other countries, and through applying pressure 
on parties to the conflict and State actors to resolve Ukraine’s current crisis.”246 Still, 
opinions remain mixed about who exactly should be participating in the crisis resolution 
efforts. According to the OSCE, most civil society organizations in Ukraine have 
expressed support for the high-level talks between Ukraine and Russia, and many agree 
that the US and the EU should be involved as well. Opinions are much more mixed on 
whether or not the government should negotiate with “terrorist” organizations in the 
east.247 
Though discussion was slow to begin, once the issues were on the table within 
the OSCE PC, several Western powers began advocating intervention. The EU, for 
example, declared in its first on-record statement that it “stands ready to consider a 
facilitating role for the OSCE in Ukraine, using the toolbox and relevant mechanisms 
available within our organization.”248 Resistance from both the Russian representatives 
and from Yanukovych’s government, however, delayed meaningful action until after 
Yanukovych fled office. According to Yekelchyk, this fact remained irrelevant as a lack 
of reliable international reporting coupled with diminished interest from Western 
governments resulted in “Western and domestic opposition leaders often [falling] 
behind the rapid tempo of revolutionary events in the solutions they offered.”249 This 
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lag in information could have been addressed through either the PCU or a separate 
independent monitoring mission had action been agreed upon more quickly. 
Unfortunately, even with support for greater international intervention, the 
OSCE’s capacity to act was greatly restrained by its consensus design. Although this 
policy gives the organization much more legitimacy when it does take action, when its 
members strongly disagree about what action should be taken, the OSCE’s ability to act 
can be dramatically decreased. Although early neutral monitoring and mediation efforts 
may have been possible (Russia actually expressed support for early mediation efforts 
between the protesters and the Yanukovych regime), as the crisis escalated, the situation 
became more and more intractable.250 When Yanukovych was driven from power in late 
February, the crisis entered into a new stage and cooperation between Russia, Ukraine, 
and the West became much more difficult. While the protesters and most of the West 
saw Yanukovych’s removal as a win for Ukrainian civil society, from Moscow’s point 
of view, it was little more than a Western coup. As Marples explains, Russia’s 
understanding of the Euromaidan Revolution contrasts strongly with that of the West. In 
Moscow’s eyes, the crisis began when the West became outraged at Yanukovych's 
refusal to sign the EU Association Agreement and thus “financed and openly supported 
a mass protest in the streets of Kyiv during which violent protesters, organized by 
nationalist extremists, set afire their own police with Molotov cocktails” and then drove 
the democratically-elected administration from power. These radicals (as the Kremlin 
understand them) then installed a pro-Western regime devoid of any pro-Russian 
representation.251 From this point of view, it should come as little surprise that the 
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Russian government was skeptical of the West’s intentions and hesitant to come to any 
agreement. When Russia annexed Crimea and began arming the rebels in the DPR and 
LPR a month later, relations further deteriorated. Despite this deterioration, however, 
even after this point the members were eventually able to come to an agreement and 
deploy a series of monitoring and mediation efforts. Had stronger international support 
for intervention been present from the beginning, it is possible that neutral OSCE 
monitoring and mediation efforts could have been dispatched even before Yanukovych's 
removal from office and Russia’s escalation of the situation. Once this early opportunity 
was lost, however, the OSCE’s capacity to influence the situation was decreased. Since 
that point, discussions within the OSCE PC have become much more difficult. In an 
interview with Die Welt, OSCE Secretary General Lamberto Zannier described the 
atmosphere in the organization as reminiscent of that of the Cold War.252 
Finally, even after the OSCE member states were able to agree on the creation 
and deployment of several missions, the efforts of these missions were hindered by a 
lack of transparency from the organization and a lack of public trust from the people in 
the affected areas of Ukraine. Examining public perception of the SMM around the time 
of its deployment reveals this skepticism. When it was first deployed, many in the 
public expressed distrust for the SMM connected with fears of manipulation by Russia, 
fundamental misunderstandings of the mission’s goals and capabilities, and lack of faith 
in its ability of the mission to achieve its goals. 
Perhaps the most frequent criticism of the SMM has been rooted in fears of 
Russian manipulation or collusion. When the mission was first organized, Russian 
                                               




occupiers barred it from traveling to Crimea by claiming the territory was no longer part 
of Ukraine. Reasoning that some monitoring was better than none, the organizers of the 
mission decided to deploy monitors to the rest of Ukraine, however some interpreted the 
SMM’s deployment to all of Ukraine but Crimea as a political statement which de facto 
recognized Russia’s annexation of the peninsula.253 This confusion could have been 
cleared up relatively easily, but the OSCE failed to provide any public information on 
the deployment until well after the mission was established, denying stakeholders a full 
explanation of the goals and scale of the mission. 
Further fears arose in the accusation that Russia was using the SMM as a sort of 
Trojan horse to allow its representatives to assist the separatists occupying the contested 
regions. These fears were connected in part with the fact that Russian monitors were 
allowed to participate in the mission while Ukrainian monitors were excluded, and in 
part from widespread misinformation spread during the initial deployment of the 
mission.254 In the first month of deployment, there were several instances of Ukrainian 
and Western political figures citing incorrect information on the size of Russian 
influence over the SMM. Though only 26 of the initial 459 monitors were Russian 
citizens, in one of the more spectacular claims, an advisor to Ukrainian Defense 
Minister Basil Budik declared on national television that over 80% of the monitors were 
Russian.255 Though he subsequently apologized and rescinded his claim, 
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misinformation like this undermined the legitimacy of the SMM and threatened its 
ability to maintain public trust. 
Further examples of criticism and pro-Russian skepticism abound. One 
prominent Russian human rights activist blamed the OSCE staff directly for cooperating 
with Russian-backed militants when she was prevented from assisting refugees in 
crossing from the crisis zone to Western Ukraine.256 Another Ukrainian analyst 
lamented that the OSCE is “fooled by Russia and their proxies in the Donbass.”257 Still 
another speculated that Russian intelligence had infiltrated the OSCE and was 
manipulating the mission from the inside, further lambasting the organization for its 
unwillingness to “solve” the crisis.258 Seizing on this idea of Russian manipulation, 
another reported described the OSCE as Moscow’s “useful idiot.”259 Of course, 
Moscow and the rebelling factions take the opposite stance, decrying the SMM as 
unfairly biased in favor of what they believe to be an illegitimate government in Kyiv. 
Thus though the SMM strives to impartially report on conditions on the ground, an 
initial failure to properly communicate the purpose, parameters, and plan of the mission 
has led to simultaneous conflicting accusations that the SMM is both excessively “pro-
Russian” and inappropriately “pro-Ukrainian.”260 Had the OSCE been more transparent 
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from the initial deployment, such misinformation would have been harder to spread and 
the SMM would likely have enjoyed greater support in its early stage. 
Further complaints were directed at the mission’s perceived lack of empathy for 
those affected by the conflict. As one journalist complained, “the unproductiveness of 
the mission is reinforced by its external image. In a city that has been effectively under 
siege for more than a year, where the majority of remaining residents are forced not to 
live but to survive, counting every last coin, the OSCE’s expensive cars jam the luxury 
hotel parking lot on Pushkin Boulevard while mission members feast at restaurants, 
engendering hatred and negativity among the locals.”261 In a similar vein, one resident 
in the DPR described the SMM as “foreign masters dining in expensive restaurants and 
from time to time going out on safari to get a feel for the locale.”262 While living in 
rebel-held oblasts do support the efforts of the SMM, negatives perception such as these 
can hurt public trust in the mission and diminish its capacity to effectively monitoring 
the progression of the crisis in the region. 
Even for those who trusted the intention of the SMM, there was initial 
skepticism and anger directed at the mission linked to widespread misunderstanding of 
what exactly the SMM is supposed to do. As the Deputy Chief Monitor of the SMM 
Aleška Simkić explained in an interview with the Euromaidan Press: 
 
Our job is to report on what we see, what we hear and what we can verify. If we 
cannot meet those criteria, the information does not make it into our reports. 
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Often we cannot accurately verify who is shelling or shooting; however, we 
include as much detail as possible in our reports. We conduct our observations 
and reporting this way not for the sake of neutrality, but for the sake of accuracy 
and to avoid being involved in speculation. Our reporting is both balanced and 
factual. We report what we see with our own eyes or means of observing; 
however, it is up to the reader, including the sides, to decide on how they use 
this information. We don’t hide anything – if we know it, we report on it.263 
 
The SMM mandate is one of observation and reporting. They do not investigate, 
proclaim guilt, or otherwise involve themselves in the conflict. Instead, the SMM is 
intended to provide information in support of stakeholders and policy makers in taking 
action to resolve the crisis. Further, while the SMM does assist in facilitating the 
distribution of humanitarian aid, it does not itself source or distribute the aid. Despite 
this clear mandate, initial poor communication with the target regions led to widespread 
criticism of the mission as ineffective for not accomplishing goals which do not actually 
fall within its stated mandate.264 
Even among those who understand the SMM’s mandate, there exist legitimate 
concern about the SMM’s operational capability in the face of a sophisticated military 
force.265 In just the first year, the SMM dealt with two instances of having its monitors 
kidnapped, several instances of having its drones shot down, one occasion were several 
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SMM vehicles were destroyed in an arson attack, and numerous impediments in its 
physical maneuvering.266 A lack of training preparing monitoring for these challenges 
further diminished the SMM’s ability to achieve results. Some doubted that the SMM 
has even been given access needed to fulfill its mandate: “Because it takes SMM patrols 
more than three hours to drive to the border, monitors must drive past numerous 
separatist checkpoints, giving combined Russian-separatist forces plenty of time to 
ensure there is nothing of consequence for the SMM to see once it arrives at the 
Ukrainian border with Russia,”267 These setbacks damaged international perceptions of 
the SMM and, more broadly, of the OSCE’s crisis management efforts. While more 
information would not necessarily have prevented these unfortunate events, it would 
have assisted policy makers and the public at large in creating reasonable expectations 
for the mission. With greater transparency comes stronger public trust: strong public 
trust directly supports the OSCE’s ability to carry out its missions. 
 
Conclusion: Crisis Frozen 
 According to Sammut, “when the crisis reached its climax in February 2014, the 
OSCE was better informed and prepared to make decisions than in any other crisis in its 
history.”268 Despite this optimal position, the organization fell short in responding to the 
2013-14 Euromaidan Revolution. While its eventual monitoring and mediation efforts 
should not be discounted, a slow response, a general lack of transparency, a lack of 
initial international support, and difficulties in cooperation among its members 
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prevented the OSCE from having the same impact in 2013-14 as it did in 2004. Because 
of its slow response, the OSCE’s role in 2013-14 was more crisis management than 
crisis prevention. The organization itself has recognized this “failure of prevention” in 
one of its own reports, noting that the costs of ending a conflict always outweigh the 
costs of preventing it. According to this report, one of the primary “lessons learned” 
from the conflict was that “the OSCE should give priority to conflict prevention and 
should empower the Secretary General to act on its behalf in pursuit of this 
objective.”269 With that said, the OSCE’s eventual response to the Euromaidan 
Revolution and ensuing crisis in Ukraine has been considerably stronger than any 
single-state response. As Lehne explains, “The Ukraine crisis has revived the 
organization. While political crisis management has been left mainly to a few capitals 
working with the parties to the conflict, the OSCE’s monitoring mission in Ukraine has 
become an essential factor of stability. Violence has not stopped, however, and the 
mission’s work remains hampered by insufficient cooperation from the parties.”270 In 
other words, the OSCE’s crisis response to the Euromaidan Revolution was good, but 
not good enough. With greater support and cooperation among its members, the 
organization could expand on the best aspects of its crisis response and have an even 
more meaningful impact on future crises. While the OSCE failed in preventing the 
Euromaidan Revolution from developing into a long-term international crisis, its efforts 
should not be discounted. Indeed, it is vital that the OSCE learns from both its successes 
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and its failures in order to more effectively work in the future in support of peace, 






The OSCE as a Means of Crisis Management 
At its core, the OSCE exists to support peace and security across Europe. As can 
be seen from its response to the 2004 Orange Revolution, the organization possesses the 
tools and capacity to positively influence intrastate crises through monitoring and 
mediation when its response is reasonably quick and properly supported. When it lacks 
international support, public trust, agreement among its members, or a reasonable 
response time, however, the OSCE’s effectiveness dramatically decreases. 
Unfortunately, as seen in the 2013-14 Euromaidan Revolution, the organization can be 
undervalued, challenged by disagreements between its members, stymied by its own 
lack of transparency, and generally hindered in pursuing its objectives. In the wake of 
the Euromaidan Revolution, many academics and policy makers questioned the 
organization’s relevance, and some believed that its failure to effectively intervene in 
2013 would lead to the end for the organization.271 Though it did eventually engage in 
monitoring and mediation efforts, the OSCE’s interventions in 2014 simply came too 
late to slow crisis escalation as it did in 2004. Its eventual action should not be 
discounted, however, as it has highlighted the unique position of the OSCE and its 
continued relevance as the only European security forum which boasts broad 
membership and a history of successful crisis management. Sammut argues that rather 
than doom the organization, the Euromaidan Revolution gave the OSCE “a new lease of 
life.”272 With a concerted effort to solve the challenges hindering the organization, the 
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OSCE could better employ its best practices of monitoring and mediation more quickly 
and more effectively in the future, allowing for outcomes which more strongly resemble 
that of the 2004 Orange Revolution. 
 
Continued Support for the OSCE 
 Despite the challenges the OSCE faced in responding to the Euromaidan 
Revolution, support for the OSCE’s continued involvement in the crisis resolution 
process persists both internationally and locally. Although the Minsk II agreement has 
failed to produce a stable ceasefire on the ground, it remains the most inclusive and 
productive negotiations conducted so far and the best hope at stabilizing the conflict. 
Further, while the SMM was initially plagued by a lack of public trust, as it has better 
communicated its mission to the public and become more effective in carrying that 
mission out, local support for its continued presence has grown. 
 Many conflict stakeholders have expressed the belief that any inclusive 
negotiations are key to producing a tenable solution to the ongoing crisis. In 
interviewing approximately 260 civil society organizations (CSOs) across Ukraine, the 
SMM found that despite the failure of Minsk II so far, “the predominant opinion 
amongst respondents was that high-level conflict resolution efforts such as the Minsk 
talks should be upheld, and that intensified efforts should be carried out to foster 
inclusive dialogue at all levels (community, local and inter-regional levels), creating 
spaces also for views of civil society representatives, including at the grass-roots levels. 




talks.” 273 Additional suggestions including increasing the involvement of the EU and 
UN and of establishing additional contacts amongst the separatists in the east. Other 
analysts have echoed the idea that a lasting peace must be built on inclusive 
representations of the country’s diverse regions and competing interest groups.274 As 
the only outside organization with lasting contacts on both sides of the conflict, the 
OSCE is well suited to continue to assist in connecting conflict stakeholders. According 
to OSCE Secretary General Zannier, the organization enjoys free access and movement 
among the Ukrainian government’s forces and limited but consistent access among the 
separatists. 275 
 Despite its many initial challenges, the SMM too enjoys continued and growing 
support. Interestingly, because it has established itself as a reliable and impartial source 
of information on the crisis in the east, the SMM is seen as vital in countering the very 
propaganda that initially hindered its work. According to the above survey of Ukrainian 
CSOs, “biased media coverage and what is referred to as propaganda were brought up 
by many organizations as major obstacles for conflict resolution and dialogue. It is here 
that most CSOs saw the OSCE’s and more specifically, the OSCE Special Monitoring 
Mission’s contribution as necessary. The OSCE’s main role was seen as the provider of 
reliable and impartial monitoring and information on conflict in the east.” 276 Although 
several CSOs criticized the SMM’s performance up to that point, the common opinion 
was that the mission needed to be improved rather than scrapped. Further, some CSOs 
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expressed the belief that the SMM should be more directly involved in the negotiation 
and mediation efforts and could better connect stakeholders in the east to the talks in 
Minsk.277 Respondents also expressed hope that the SMM would collaborate more with 
civil society groups, help them to establish inter-regional contacts, and enhance their 
capacity in the field of conflict resolution and dialogue.278 
 
The OSCE’s Best Practices 
As a soft power IO with a broad definition of security and a massive area of 
operation, the OSCE risks being overwhelmed by the sheer scale of problems it aims to 
address. Rather than trying to solve crises, however, the OSCE excels at empowering 
stakeholders with the information and structures needed for conflict resolution. 
Specifically, its crisis monitoring and mediation efforts constitute two of its best 
practices. 
  Accurate, up-to-date information is incredibly important in crisis management. 
A problem becomes easier to address when it is better understood and documented. By 
providing impartial, current information on the development of a crisis, the OSCE both 
provides decision-makers with the necessary information to intervene and prevents 
parties in the conflict from misrepresenting events. Real-time, on-the-ground reporting 
draws interest from abroad and can be used to apply pressure to conflict participants 
through greater accountability. If the world is watching a protest unfold, a repressive 
government may be less likely to use violence to silence the opposition, as in the 
bloodless Orange Revolution. Thanks to the OSCE IEOM reports, Kuchma’s 
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administration was discouraged from cracking down violently on protesters. Further, 
when the rerun of the second round of the election was held, neither Russia nor 
Yanukovych was able to successfully dispute the results because the elections were 
monitored by an impartial IO. Finally, by providing reports on the progress of reforms, 
pressure is maintained despite the passing of time. In 2004, for example, the OSCE 
IEOM was able to use these reports to show the lack of action by Kuchma’s 
government to address elections issues, a key fact in the decision to rerun the second 
round of the elections.  
 For lasting conflict resolution, conflict stakeholders must be the drivers of the 
settlement efforts. Operating on this understanding, the OSCE’s primary role is one of 
facilitating the negotiation process rather than itself attempting to solve disputes.279 
Naturally, gathering conflicting parties together to negotiate peace is rarely an easy task. 
As such, the value of the OSCE’s contribution lies in its ability to bring divergent 
groups together and overcome the barriers to dialogue. A conflict mediator can play 
many roles in the negotiation process, but the OSCE focuses on engaging disputing 
parties and helping to reframe their understanding and attitude toward the dispute. 
Hopmann explains the potential benefits of OSCE mediation, noting that “the mediator 
may assist [conflicting parties] to reframe the issues so that they no longer appear to be 
‘zero-sum,’ to overcome stereotyped images of their ‘enemies,’ to locate possible 
formulas that merge their joint interests and identities rather than divide them, and to 
make concessions that will not entail loss of face or opening themselves to exploitation 
by the other.”280 This reframing breaks down the barriers to resolution and encourages 
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productive discussion to take place. According to Hopmann, “What matters in the 
eventual success of the intervention is usually the OSCE representative’s ability to 
assist the disputants to move away from hard bargaining based on competing interests 
and into a problem-solving mode.”281 In 2004, the OSCE was able to use its influence 
and legitimacy to encourage all of the parties to remain at the table long enough for a 
settlement to be reached. Though negotiation efforts took much longer to initiate in 
2014, the OSCE-moderated talks in Minsk remain the only negotiation efforts to 
include representatives from the Ukrainian government, Russia, and the separatist 
regions. 
 
Barriers to Success 
Unfortunately, despite the incredible potential of the OSCE to positively 
influence crisis situations, it faces numerous challenges, all of which delayed the 
organization's action in the wake of the Euromaidan Revolution and diminished its 
eventual impact. A lack of international support, disagreement among members, a lack 
of public trust, and a slow response are all key issues that need to be addressed. 
One of the most significant problems facing the OSCE is that many 
governments simply fail to recognize its potential and thus fail to provide it proper 
support. In arguing for greater international support for the OSCE, Biscop explains, 
“Neither in the public debate nor in the Brussels policy-making scene is the OSCE a 
major topic. Rather than seeking to profile itself vis-a-vis the OSCE, the EU often 
simply seems to ignore it, developing its own policies and capabilities and deploying 
                                               




missions in areas where the OSCE has been active for a long time.”282 Sammut, on the 
other hand, asserts that the EU undervalues the OSCE by treating it primarily as a "feel-
good mechanism – a tool that can be deployed to park problems for which there is no 
immediate solution, whilst giving the impression that it is actively engaged with the 
issue.”283 In both of these situations, the significant potential of the OSCE is being 
missed and its core benefits ignored. In a similar vein, Hopmann characterizes the US’s 
approach to the OSCE as “cautious,” noting it often fails to capitalize on the potential of 
the organization because of this caution.284 He also argues that “because the OSCE is 
thought by some to be too weak and undependable, the United States and other key 
governments have not provided the economic and human resources, and political 
support necessary to develop its potential fully. Furthermore, even its limited but 
important successes have largely gone unnoticed in the United States. Hence, the 
organization seldom has received the credit that it deserves for what it has 
accomplished.”285 If the organization’s strengths or past successes are not recognized by 
its member governments, it is unlikely to receive the support it needs to achieve similar 
success in the future. 
The Russian government, on the other hand, has expressed concern over the 
purported manipulation IOs including the OSCE by the West. In a speech in the wake of 
the Euromaidan Revolution, Putin asserted, “Key international institutions are not 
getting any stronger; on the contrary, in many cases, they are sadly degrading. Our 
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western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by 
international law in their practical politics, but by the rule of the gun.”286 Here Putin 
challenges the legitimacy of the OSCE, implying it is being used by the US and its 
allies to push a Western agenda by force in Russia’s own backyard. Giulio notes that 
Russia has expressed decreased support for the OSCE over the last several years as the 
Kremlin has come to believe that the organization shows a bias for Western 
priorities.287 Matching this trend, Russia’s position on the world stage has changed 
dramatically since the institutionalization of the OSCE. As it has grown economically 
and politically more powerful, Russia has seen a decrease in it need to work through 
Western-back IOs to push its priorities, instead showing a greater and greater preference 
for opposing non-Western organizations such as the CIS and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization. Governments of other CIS countries have similarly criticized the OSCE 
for focusing too much on human rights and democratic institutions to the detriment of 
supporting host governments and state sovereignty. 
 As member states value the organization less and less, cooperation within the 
OSCE becomes more difficult. If member states are not committed to addressing crises 
in part through the OSCE, they have little reason to negotiate and achieve consensus 
within the organization. Dominguez argues that the two greatest challenges to OSCE 
effectiveness are the resurgent ideological confrontations between Russia and the 
US/EU and competition with other regional organizations.288 Many critics focus on the 
challenges of the OSCE’s consensus policy, claiming this feature results in a slower 
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slow response time and an inability to take action on more controversial subjects. 
Dominguez defends the OSCE’s consensus rules, however, explaining that while 
consensus voting has its disadvantages, it “has enhanced the willingness of states to 
expand topics on their common agenda, to broaden the scope of their commitments and 
to augment the OSCE’s capacities for implementation and monitoring. […] While the 
OSCE imposes no legal obligations, their process of peer review has fostered an 
impressive record of implementation.” 289 Indeed, the challenges of the consensus 
policy can actually be seen as one of the organization’s greatest strengths because when 
member states are committed to addressing crises through the OSCE, the perceived 
legitimacy of the organization’s crisis response is greatly enhanced. This is only 
possible when the member states value the OSCE and are committed to involving it in 
the crisis resolution process. When the OSCE lacks broad based international support, a 
consensus is much harder to achieve. The OSCE’s design creates a standard framework 
in which the US, EU, Russia, and all other member states regularly meet and can work 
through disagreements as they arise, but only when these states are willing to engage in 
the discussions. 290 
Other fears which have led to decreased international support and public trust 
are connected to the operational capacity of the OSCE. Speaking on its relative newness 
on the international stage, Sammut concedes that “the organization is not old or 
experienced enough to have had a number of successes and failures on which 
precedents and good practices could be built.”291 Other policymakers believe the OSCE 
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to be an unreliable tool in resolving conflicts in crisis situations because, unlike the UN 
or NATO, it lacks its own peacekeeping forces.292 Finally, to many policy makers, the 
overlapping mandates of the various European security institutions have obscured 
each’s potential and spread resources too thin: “The shake-up of the European security 
architecture produced by the end of the Cold War has not led to a clear-cut division of 
labour between the different actors involved. [...] The expansion of the EU and NATO 
in terms of both competencies and membership and the institutionalization of the OSCE 
have resulted in an intricate web of functionally and geographically overlapping 
institutions.”293 This redundancy has led to a frequent duplication of effort by these 
organizations and a suboptimal distribution of resources to projects across Europe. 
These operations challenges may also be linked to an issue of funding for the 
organization, which in turn may reflect a decreasing value some member states attribute 
to the OSCE’s work. While tracking challenges in the OSCE’s budget over time would 
provide valuable evidence in the analysis of obstacles to OSCE effectiveness, 
unfortunately OSCE budget information is not made publically available, a challenge 
which is linked to broader OSCE issues of transparency. 
 Finally, the deployment of the SMM is just one example of the poor 
transparency and insufficient public trust threatening the OSCE. Several academics 
have noted difficulty in examining the day-to-day functioning of the organization. As 
Sammut explains, “[Within the OSCE] information is disseminated in an opaque 
fashion, as decisions are made collectively, with little insight available into the process 
through which conclusions have been reached. It is often difficult to get the OSCE to 
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respond directly to queries, or to explain why decisions were taken.” 294 Though the 
OSCE maintains publicly-accessible digital archives, a lack of sufficient funding has 
left them poorly organized and missing information. Despite the fact that weekly PC 
meetings are one of the most important and frequent forums of decision-making in the 
OSCE, published PC meeting minutes often omit considerable detail and individual 
comments from member states are only retained if the speaking country specifically 
requests the inclusion of the comment in the record. Both the media and the public at 
large are generally barred from observing PC meetings. While this in theory should 
allow the countries to debate more freely, in reality PC statements are typically prepared 
ahead of time and simply read during the meetings. According to Leverdier and Devin, 
this lack of publicly available information is an issue present in most major IOs.295 
Better record keeping and more publicly available information would improve 
transparency and boost public trust in the organization. 
Greater international support, more agreement among members, and stronger 
public trust would allow for the OSCE to respond to crises in a more timely fashion. 
Hopmann sums up the dilemma of the OSCE succinctly, saying, “There can be little 
doubt that the OSCE has failed to meet many of the expectations generated on its behalf 
when the Cold War came to an end [...]. In large part this is due less to the inherent 
inadequacies of the institution than to the unwillingness of member states to make the 
necessary contributions of human and economic resources as well as political support to 
enable the OSCE to be more successful.”296 Even the best-designed organization cannot 
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achieve its objectives if it lacks the support and funding of its members. 
 
Suggested Improvements 
The OSCE is experienced, well positioned, and focused on an inclusive basket 
of security concerns. More than anything it needs appreciation for its potential and 
stronger support for its continued functioning. This is not a solitary suggestion, but 
rather supported by several scholars in the field. Hopmann argues that “what is needed 
is a recognition of the concrete accomplishments already made by the OSCE and 
support for the optimistic but not unrealistic belief that some modest efforts to 
strengthen the OSCE could make a significant positive contribution to a more secure 
common future for all Europeans ‘from Vancouver to Vladivostok.’”297 Sammut, on the 
other hand, focuses on the EU, writing, “The EU needs to recognize its important role 
within the OSCE context, as the organization representing nearly half of the OSCE 
member states. It should sharpen its performance and up its game in OSCE councils. It 
also needs to define its own vision of what it wants the OSCE to be in the future and 
build a coordinated position amongst its members.”298 When the Euromaidan 
Revolution began, for example, the EU pushed several ultimately-unsuccessful conflict 
resolution efforts without consulting or including the OSCE, wasting resources and 
duplicating effort.299 Had it chosen to instead work within the framework of the OSCE, 
its efforts would have been more inclusive of the conflict stakeholders and potentially 
more effective in addressing the unfolding crisis. 
                                               
297 Ibid., 608. 
298 Sammut and D’Urso, “The Special Monitoring Mission,” 4. 




 Beyond potentially benefiting from greater support from its member states, the 
OSCE would likely greatly benefit from closer cooperation with other international 
organizations. Larive notes that there are currently no formal linkages between the 
decision making bodies of the EU, NATO, and the OSCE.300 For the sake of 
coordinating action, sharing information, and preventing the duplication of work, this 
should be changed. Indeed, the OSCE as a whole would benefit from a clearer role in 
the European security architecture and deeper cooperation with NATO, the EU, and the 
CIS.301 All three of these groups should improve information exchange and operational 
cooperation with the OSCE, moves which would cut overall costs and decrease the 
duplication of conflict-resolution efforts. It is vital that as greater cooperation with the 
EU and NATO is achieved, equal effort is given to the inclusion of the CIS and other 
Russia-backed institutions in order to forestall claims of bias. In terms of operational 
security, the UN, NATO, and CIS all could serve as potential partners, providing 
peacekeeping forces in high-risk areas in order to ensure safer, more effective OSCE 
observation missions.302 Finally, these organizations could greatly benefit from drawing 
more frequently on the OSCE’s rich experience. As Hopmann explains, “The OSCE has 
invented and developed more fully than any other regional organization certain 
techniques and institutional structures to deal with violent conflict that might usefully 
be applied elsewhere, either by regional security organizations or the UN.”303 Rather 
than reinventing the wheel every time a crisis arises, regional security organizations and 
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the UN alike could benefit from incorporating relevant OSCE’s best practices into their 
own crisis-resolution strategies. 
 
The OSCE’s Potential for Positive Impact 
 Though considerable misinformation about the OSCE’s effectiveness prevails in 
policy circles, many scholars in the field have attested to both the organization’s 
potential and actual real-world impact. Specifically, the organization's flexibility and 
ability to rapidly respond to crisis situations are often cited, along with its inclusive 
membership and unique position in the European security sphere. Political scientist 
James Sperling takes the broad approach, calling NATO and the OSCE “the two most 
important regional security organizations.”304 Foreign Policy analyst Samuel Goda 
employs similarly broad-assertions in discussing the necessity of involving 
organizations like the OSCE to resolve disputes, stating, “International organizations 
are one of the most important tools for dealing with crisis management.”305 Stuart 
Horsman, international relations expert, focuses his analysis, noting the OSCE’s 
particular advantage in providing essential assistance in conflict prevention and 
confidence building in regions where political confidence and cooperation are 
lacking.306 Hopmann, a scholar of conflict management, emphasizes the flexibility and 
adaptability of the organization which enables it to respond and adapt to developing 
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crises more quickly than most other institutions.307 In a separate article, he contests “the 
two greatest attributes of the OSCE are its proven ability to strengthen democratic 
institutions in societies undergoing transition and its capacity to respond rapidly to 
crises.”308 Finally, Alice Ackermann, senior operational advisor at the Conflict 
Prevention Center of the OSCE, argues that it is important to consider the OSCE in 
context as an inclusive soft power organization focused on cooperation and 
comprehensive security.309 While many policy makers continue to disparage the 
organization, some assert the OSCE offers much greater potential than it is typically 
afforded. As Sammut explains, “[The OSCE’s] strength has been in its ability to make 
modest incremental contributions, alongside other parties, often carrying out the 
detailed work necessary to make more publicized activities successful. It often operates 
quietly, outside the glare of publicity, so that the large number of significant 
contributions it has made to security building in Eurasia have frequently gone largely 
unnoticed.”310 In this way, the OSCE’s incredible potential often goes entirely 
unrecognized, overshadowed by the work of more prominent (but not necessarily more 
capable) intergovernmental organizations. 
Though it offers great promise in the realm of crisis resolution, the OSCE 
simply cannot operate without sufficient access to resources, support, and information. 
As Hopmann contests, “In the effort to revive these war-torn societies, the OSCE 
cannot succeed alone, but its contribution is nonetheless essential to the successful 
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308 Hopmann, Building Security, vi. 
309 Alice Ackermann, forward to Peace and Security in the Postmodern World: the OSCE and Conflict 
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accomplishment of this task.”311 In the end, the OSCE is a tool to solve problems. If 
properly utilized, as it was in the Orange Revolution, it carries the potential to 
significantly positively influence crisis situations. When undervalued by its members, 
however, as occurred during the Euromaidan Revolution, its enormous potential largely 
goes to waste.  
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Appendix - Acronyms 
CEC - Central Electoral Commission 
CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States 
CSCE - Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
CSO - Civil Society Organization 
DPR - Donetsk People’s Republic 
EMO - Election Monitoring Organization 
EP - European Parliament 
EU - European Union 
FSC - Forum for Security Cooperation 
HCNM - High Commissioner on National Minorities 
IEOM - International Election Observation Mission 
IO - International Organization 
LPR - Lugansk People’s Republic 
MH17 - Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 
NGO - Non-Governmental Organization 
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
ODIHR - Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
PA - Parliamentary Assembly 
PC - Permanent Council 
PACE - Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 




PSC - Polling Station Commission 
SMM - Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine 
SR - Socialist Republic 
TEC - Territorial Election Commission 
UN - United Nations 
US - United States of America 
USSR - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
